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Introduction
I am alone here, running the store. These people, I don't know
why they hate me like that. I am a Christian. I have done noth-
ing wrong. I have a family. If they close me down, I'll have to
go on welfare.'
A liquor license is undoubtedly a powerful commodity. But li-
cense holders are subject to state and local regulation affecting their
right to sell a product which has commonly been deemed harmful to
public health, safety, welfare, and morals. In many cases, licensees
may be constitutionally protected against such public regulation.2 The
holder of a liquor license will receive procedural due process protec-
1. Kathryn Balint, Key Meeting About Liquor Store Evaporates, S. D. UNION-TRIB.,
Dec. 8, 1993, at B3 (liquor store owner expresses dismay at being "unfairly targeted" by
neighborhood activists and California Department of Alcohol Beverage Control to control
liquor sales).
2. Constitutional claims such as Commerce Clause violations, First Amendment in-
terferences, and even Establishment Clause violations may be raised when the sale of li-
quor is regulated. These challenges, however, are beyond the scope of this Article. See
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (holding Massachusetts statute,
which vested power in churches and schools to control liquor licenses within five hundred
foot radius, violates Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it "enmeshes
churches in the process of government"); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 110-11 (1972)
(upholding regulation which prohibited explicitly sexual live entertainment and films in
bars and other establishments licensed to dispense liquor); State Bd. of Equalization v.
Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (allowing states to impose license fee on beer importa-
tion that would have been prohibited under the Commerce Clause); S & S Liquor Mart,
Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729,731 (R.I. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that a liquor-adver-
tising ban offended both the Commerce Clause and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act). 'Tpi-
cally, First Amendment challenges to liquor license regulation arise in the context of live
sexual entertainment. In a decision upholding the constitutionality of denying a liquor
license to an establishment that promoted explicit sexual live entertainment, the Court
held that state regulations under the Twenty-first Amendment are entitled to a presump-
tion of validity. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 115. Subsequent decisions involving similar challenges
have found that "a state may regulate such entertainment as part of a liquor license pro-
gram without violating the First Amendment" based on the LaRue holding. City of
Rancho Cucamonga v. Warner Consulting Servs., 262 Cal. Rptr. 349, 351 (Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, when liquor control is involved, the 'Wenty-first Amendment confers "some-
thing more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals." Id
(quoting LaRue, 409 U.S. at 114); see infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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tion and protection against a "taking" of property for public purposes
only if the liquor license is considered "property."'3 Thus, it is neces-
sary, in addressing these particular constitutional concerns, to identify
potential property interests which may exist in the license itself.' Con-
stitutional protection for substantive due process and equal protection
violations does not require the existence of a property interest, but
does require that the regulatory action be at a minimum rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.5
Public regulation of liquor licensing seeks to address many differ-
ent social issues at both the state and local levels. Under the Twenty-
first Amendment, great deference is given to states to regulate in this
area.6  The TWenty-first Amendment in no way preempts constitu-
tional requirements of other amendments, 7 even though it "created an
exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause."' Thus,
although states are granted authority to regulate intoxicating liquors
under the Twenty-first Amendment, these regulations are still subject
to other constitutional guarantees. 9
The over-concentration of liquor stores in urban neighborhoods
and its significant detrimental impact on inner-city communities are
3. "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). "No state shall... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(emphasis added).
4. Identification of a license as property may also be essential to issues such as lien
attachments by creditors, or for tax purposes. See 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line
Restaurant, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 202,205 (E.D. Pa. 1985), rev'd, 790 F.2d 354 (3rd Cir. 1986)
(stating it is "well-settled in Pennsylvania that a liquor license cannot be subject to the
execution process, nor can it be subject to a valid security interest"). See infra text accom-
panying note 61; see also infra note 59.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 229-50.
6. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)(citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964)).
7. The IWenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The transportation or importation into any State... for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXI, §2 (emphasis added).
8. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964)). In expressly granting power to the states, the
'Wenty-first Amendment "'confer[s] something more than the normal state authority over
public health, welfare and morals."' S & S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729,732
(R.I. 1985) (quoting California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)).
9. Boren, 429 U.S. at 206 (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377
U.S. 324,330 (1964)). The Twenty-first Amendment does, however, entitle any state action
regulating alcohol to "an' added presumption in favor of [its] validity."' S & S Liquor
Mart, Inc., 497 A.2d at 732 (quoting New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S.
714, 718 (1981)).
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areas in which public regulation has been used to address societal ills
associated with liquor sales. 10 Some state legislatures have tried to
combat this problem by exercising regulatory powers aimed at liquor
licensing." Local authorities have also endeavored to control liquor
sales by invoking the Twenty-first Amendment power or by invoking
the general police power to regulate for the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. Constitutional concerns may arise, how-
ever, when government attempts to resolve the social problems associ-
ated with overconcentration of retail sales through control of such
sales.
Any person whose constitutional rights have been violated by an-
other person acting under color of state law has a cause of action
under title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code (hereinafter
§ 1983).12 Section 1983 provides the bases for suits against state and
10. A University of Southern California study by Dr. Richard Scribner suggests a
"high correlation between the number of liquor stores and a neighborhood's crime rate."
Jill Gottesman, Corking the Bottle" Cities Try to Limit the Sale of Packaged Spirits, L.A.
TmES, July 26, 1992, at JI (citing Karen Bass, Executive Director of Community Coalition
for Substance Abuse Prevention). According to the National Institute on Alcoholism, li-
quor contributes to 80% of the homicides and 60% of the injuries in African-American
and Hispanic dominated inner-cities. Clarence Johnson, L.A. After the Riots; A Fight to
Keep Liquor Stores Shut, S.F. CHRON., July 1, 1992, at A5; see also Marc Lacey, Last Call
For Liquor Outlets, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1992, at A14 (stating that "[i]n roughly one-half
to two-thirds of homicides and serious assaults, alcohol is found in the perpetrator or vic-
tim, or both").
11. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23958 (West 1985) (application for a license may
be denied "if issuance of such license would tend to create a law enforcement problem, or
if issuance would result in or add to an undue concentration of licenses. . ."); CoLO. Rnv.
STAT. § 12-47-137(2)(a) (1991) (local licensing agency shall consider evidence regarding
the "number, type, and availability of liquor outlets located in or near the neighborhood
under consideration" before approving or denying an application); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 30-46(a)(3) (1990) (department of liquor control may deny permit if "number of permit
premises in the locality is such that the granting of a permit is detrimental to public inter-
est, and, in reaching a conclusion in this respect, the department may consider the charac-
ter of, the population of, the number of like permits and number of all permits existent in
the particular town and the immediate neighborhood concerned, the effect which a new
permit may have on such town or neighborhood or on like permits existent in such town or
neighborhood"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-115(b)(2)(c) (1992) (Board may consider "whether
issuance of license would create or contribute to an overconcentration of licensed estab-
lishments"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 241.075(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981) (retail pack-
age liquor license may not be issued if proposed business will be within 700 feet of a similar
establishment); MD. ANN. CODE ART. 2B, § 10-202(f) (1994) (in certain counties, Board of
License Commissioners must take into consideration "the number of licenses already is-
sued" before issuing another).
12. E. CHEmEmlNsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 370 (1989). Forty-two U.S.C. § 1983
provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia subjects, or causes to
local governments and officials to remedy U.S. constitutional viola-
tions. 13 A § 1983 claim may allow a licensee to collect damages and
attorneys fees when there has been an unconstitutional interference
with liquor license rights.
First, a liquor licensee may allege a denial of procedural due pro-
cess under the Fourteenth Amendment.14 To be protected against a
state action taken without proper notice or hearing, however, a licen-
see must have a "property" or a "liberty" interest at stake.15 Occa-
sionally, real property interests are affected when government
regulates property use. Most procedural due process challenges in-
volving liquor licensing, however, arise when the personal property
aspect of the license is affected. 6 The procedural due process analysis
in this Article therefore focuses on the extent of protection required
from a governmental unit when its actions affect the personal property
interest in a liquor license.
Second, the license holder may claim that a particular state action
constitutes a "taking" of her "property" under the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 7 justifying an inverse condemnation remedy. Such a
"takings" claim may apply to state or local actions affecting either the
land use regulation of retail liquor sale locations, or actions affecting
the personal property interest in the license itself.' 8 This Article dis-
cusses the takings issue as it applies to both the interference with real
property interests and the impact on the liquor license as personal
property.'9
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989).
13. See Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983) (concerning a suit
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by bar owners who alleged that the Village interfered
with and eventually destroyed their business, in violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[nlor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
15. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
16. See infra notes 104-119 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See Fulmer Supermarket, Inc. v. State Director, Dep't of Liquor Control, No.
88AP-26, 1988 WL 96210, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1988) (distinguishing between
property interest in the license, which was not lost or interfered with by local-option elec-
tion, and location at which rights under the license could be exercised).
19. Many states do not recognize liquor licenses as "property" interests. See infra
notes 150-159 and accompanying text.
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Third, the licensee may assert a denial of substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment,2 ° which prohibits state actions that
are arbitrary, capricious or without a rational or reasonable relation-
ship to the "public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. '21
Often, a closely associated claim that equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment has been denied is also made.22 A license holder
claiming an equal protection violation may argue that she is unequally
burdened by a governmental action not applied to similar license
holders under similar circumstances.
Part I of this Article examines the constitutional issues that arise
when a liquor license is considered a property right. Section A dis-
cusses four attributes of liquor licenses that can be used to determine
whether the license is a constitutionally protected property interest in
a given state. Section B illustrates the applicability of these four at-
tributes to the extent that procedural due process is accorded in ac-
tions involving liquor licenses, by examining the licensing provisions
and court decisions of several states.' Section C discusses how courts
have decided whether procedural due process rights have been vio-
lated in liquor licensing actions. Section D evaluates the protection
that may be available for liquor licensees under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
Part II of the Article explores the constitutional protections pro-
vided to liquor licensees based on substantive due process and equal
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,395 (1926). The Court devel-
oped this standard to judge whether the statute satisfied the constitutional requirements of
substantive due process in determining whether local police power included the right to
enact zoning regulations for legitimate purposes. Id. at 394.
22. See infra note 229.
23. Several states, including Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, and Illinois,
have determined whether due process must be accorded in refusing to issue a liquor li-
cense. See discussion infra part I.B. Other states have only ruled on the level of due pro-
cess which must be accorded for revocation or suspension hearings. Myers v. Holshouser,
214 S.E.2d 630, 637-39 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 216 S.E.2d 907 (N.C. 1975). Still
other states have only ruled on the level of due process which must be given for a revoca-
tion of a license as opposed to refusals to issue. See, eg., Malito v. Marcin, 303 N.E.2d 262,
265 (111. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that no due process concerns were implicated by the
refusal to issue a license). But see Las Fuentes, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 N.E.2d 1093,
1096 (ll. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that although a liquor license was not property, revoca-
tion of such a license had to satisfy due process). Although state law may specifically
decline to define a liquor license as property, federal courts may require due process pro-
tection and construe the holding of a liquor license as a property interest. Hoo Chung v.
Blase, No. 86-C-3012, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11859 at *9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 1987) (stating
that, although Illinois law defines a license as a privilege and not a property right, "federal
constitutional law determines whether" the Due Process Clause applies).
protection. These two claims do not require a finding that the liquor
license is a property interest. The Article concludes by offering guide-
lines as to whether a particular state will provide constitutional pro-
tection, and to what degree, to a liquor licensee affected by state or
local regulation.
I. Constitutional Protection of a Liquor License as a
Property Interest
A. Indicators of a License's Status as a Property Interest
The word "property" denotes a legal relationship between per-
sons with respect to an object.24 Property interests are created and
defined by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an in-
dependent source such as state law - rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those ben-
efits."2 A constitutionally protected property interest must be an in-
terest that is securely held, so that it is more than a mere expectation
of an interest.26 Consequently, the need for due process and the ex-
tent of its application depends upon the characteristics of the interest
granted by a liquor license in a particular state.27
A liquor license has four attributes which delineate its property
characteristics: the right to obtain, the right to alienate, the right to
renew, and the state's right to revoke.28 These attributes determine
24. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.2 (2d ed. 1993).
25. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1972) (holding that non-tenured
professor had no liberty or property interest in continued employment).
26. Id. at 577 ("To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it.... He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.").
27. "These issues are resolved by application of a balancing test that weighs the
strength of the plaintiff's interest, the utility of the procedure being used and of the proce-
dure which the plaintiff urges, and the strength of the government's interest in resisting the
procedure." Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act:
Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1085 (1992) (citing Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976)).
This Article does not examine the extent and timing of due process required for each
of the model states beyond the basic requirements of notice, hearing and an impartial
decisionmaker since "[t]he types of 'liberty' and ' property' protected by the Due Process
Clause vary widely, and what may be required under that Clause in dealing with one set of
interests which it protects may not be required in dealing with another set of interests."
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974). See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,378
(1971) (holding that "[t]he formality and procedural requisites for [a due process] hearing
can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the
subsequent proceedings").
28. See, e.g., Sea Girt Restaurant v. Borough of Sea Girt, 625 F. Supp. 1482, 1487
(D.N.J 1986), afTd, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that the New Jersey Supreme
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whether a liquor license constitutes a property interest for purposes of
procedural due process or takings challenges. The level of constitu-
tional protection accorded a liquor license depends upon which of
these characteristics are present in the state liquor licensing
29provisions.
1. The Right To Obtain
The right to obtain a liquor license arises from the substantive
criteria specified in a state's statutory scheme for granting licenses.30
When a statute lacks substantive criteria for identifying when a license
must be granted, a license is not a property interest.31 When the statu-
tory scheme sets forth detailed rules for deciding whether to grant a
license, giving little discretion to the granting authority, it creates a
constitutionally protected property interest.32
Court held that a liquor license constitutes "property" in New Jersey after "the Court
looked beyond the language of the Alcoholic Beverage Law [which clearly pronounced
that the license was not property] to examine the attributes of the license itself") (citing
Boss Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 192 A.2d 584,586 (N.J. 1963)). The attributes of the liquor
license examined by the Court in Boss included its monetary value and transferability.
Boss, 192 A.2d at 586-87.
29. Linda L. Munden, Note, Retail Liquor Licenses and Due Process: The Creation of
Property Through Regulation, 32 EMORY L.J. 1199, 1241 (1983) (noting that both legisla-
tures and courts have implicitly recognized that requirements of due process protection are
determined by the property characteristics of a liquor license). Munden analyzes the man-
ner in which the number of licenses issued is limited by the state in order to determine the
due process protection given to liquor licensees. Id. at 1200. Although a similar analysis of
this feature is included within the "right to obtain" attribute discussion, other attributes
such as the "right to renew" are also critical in determining the level of property character-
istics accorded liquor licenses by the various states.
30. Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that Wis-
consin statute conditions the grant of a liquor license on the citizenship, age and moral
character of the applicant).
31. Id. ("To the extent a request appeals to discretion rather than to rules, there is no
property ... ."); Wilcox v. Miller, No. 89-C-20053, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19172, at *9
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 1990); see also Pietrofeso v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 743, 747 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1992) (stating that the rationale from the Scott decision is applicable to statute and
regulations pertaining to customs brokers' licenses which do not state when a license must
be granted).
32. Atlanta Bowling Ctr., Inc. v. Allen, 389 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1968) (due process
rights arise where a state sets forth specific criteria for decision to grant a license); Benel,
Inc. v. Barry, No. C-88-3413 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9692, at *7-8 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1989)
(statutory framework of rules along with "presumption of an applicant's appropriateness in
the absence of an objection, creates a legitimate property interest for applicants");
Bayview-Lofberg's, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 710 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (E.D. Wis. 1989),
affd, 905 F.2d 142, 146 (7th Cir. 1990) (ordinance does not establish any criteria which
entitles applicants to license and since liquor license application may be denied within the
discretion of the Committee and the Common Council, plaintiffs have no property interest
in license); Mirshak v. Joyce, 652 F. Supp. 359, 367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (municipal code of
A state or local government may also limit the number of liquor
licenses issued,33 increasing the difficulty of obtaining a license and,
thus, increasing the license's value to a holder.' Property has been
defined as "every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a
right.' 35 Further, property is characterized as a legally protected ex-
pectation where one derives an advantage from the object pos-
sessed. 6 When the state places greater limitations on obtaining a
license, a holder's heightened expectation of receiving a valuable, le-
gally protected asset generates property characteristics in the li-
cense.37 "The most 'property-like' licenses are those issued in states
that set an arbitrary and inflexible limit on the number issued"38 and
those issued in states that specify substantive criteria identifying when
a license must be granted.
States generally follow one of four schemes in issuing liquor
licenses.39 Under the first scheme, the state issues a license to any
applicant who meets the statutory qualifications 0 If the statute
clearly specifies that the license must be granted whenever these qual-
ifications are met, then the applicant's expectations of receiving a pro-
Chicago specifies criteria for obtaining a liquor license, thus creating a property right for a
license applicant).
33. State ex reL Howie v. Common Council of Northfield, 101 N.W. 1063, 1064 (Minn.
1902) (power to regulate and control liquor licenses includes power to limit number of
licenses for municipality's welfare). Gartland v. Talbott, 237 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Idaho 1951)
("A limitation of the number of licenses which will be issued for the sale of intoxicants
within a municipality or within a given area is not of itself prohibitory, and is recognized as
a legitimate regulation tending to promote public health, safety and welfare within the
police power .... ").
34. Munden, supra note 29, at 1242-43 (limiting licenses issued makes the license a
valuable asset separate from the business operating under the license).
35. 6 JAMES MADISON, Property, in WrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1906).
36. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE LJ. 127,130-31 & nn.10-
11 (1990) (discussing the "reasonable expectations" approach to defining property).
37. "The 'value' of the permit is gained not from the permit itself, or the business
conducted pursuant to the permit but, instead, because of statutory and rule limitations
upon the number of permits that may be issued within a given area." Fulmer Supermarket,
Inc. v. State Director, Dep't of Liquor Control, No. AP-26, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 96210,
at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1988).
38. Munden, supra note 29, at 1243.
39. Seed at 1200.
40. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2-3, -3, -302 (Harrison, 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-301 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:84-85 (West 1989); OimA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37,
§ 527 (West Supp. 1995). For states falling into this category, there is some expectation
that if a prospective licensee meets the necessary state and local requirements, she will be
granted the right to operate a retail liquor business. Munden, supra note 29, at 1211-12.
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tectable and valuable asset may create a property interest.41 On the
other hand, the mere application for a license does not create a prop-
erty interest if the statute specifies that the license may be denied if
certain qualifications are not met.4'
The second licensing scheme gives the state discretion to deter-
mine how many licenses should be issued.4 3 Licenses issued under
this scheme have more property characteristics than those issued in
unlimited numbers due to state-imposed limitations on the issuance of
new licenses.44 The third scheme limits the number of new licenses to
a fixed statutory quantity.45 These licenses have more property char-
acteristics than the two previously mentioned schemes because nu-
merical limits are placed on the issuance of the new licenses.46
Under the fourth scheme, retail liquor outlets are operated by the
state, rather than licensed to the private Sector.47 Jurisdictions em-
ploying this approach will not be discussed since this scheme does not
allow private ownership subject to public regulation.
2. The Right To Alienate
The second attribute indicating that a liquor license is a property
interest is the right to alienate the license by transfer, assignment, or
41. See Tokumoto v. Department of Revenue of Montana, 869 P.2d 782, 783 (Mont.
1994) (licensee must fulfill criteria required by statute prior to issuance of a license); B & R
Stores, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 511 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Neb. 1994) (license must be issued to
licensee satisfying statutory requirements).
42. See Moon Jung v. Soo, 167 P2d 929, 931 (Ariz. 1946) (every liquor licensee must
be a "qualified elector"); A & H Servs. v. City of Wahpeton, 514 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D.
1994) (city had discretion to deny license if certain criteria were not met).
43. See e.g., ARx. CODE ANN . §§ 3-4-201(b), (c) (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-47-105 (1991); Min. STAT. § 340A.301 (1992); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 2,
17(2) (McKinney 1987); TEx. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. § 11.43 (West Supp. 1994). In some
states, this authority may be delegated to the local governing unit. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 04.06.090 (1994).
44. See supra notes 37-38. For states following this scheme, the state licensing author-
ity is empowered to determine whether issuing new licenses will harm the public welfare
and well-being of the public. Munden, supra note 29, at 1220.
45. The state legislature sets an arbitrary limit on the number of licenses which may be
issued within a district. Munden, supra note 29, at 1231. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 04.11.400 (1994); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23815-23825 (West 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 561.20 (West Supp. 1994); MicH. Cormp. LAws ANN. § 436.19(c) (West Supp. 1994)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-4-201 (1993).
46. Keation v. State, 173 So. 2d 673, 676 (Fla. 1965). "[D]ue to the limitations respect-
ing the number and location of liquor establishments and the conditions under which the
license is issued, a liquor license has come to have the quality of property ... ." Id. See
Munden, supra note 29, at 1200-01.
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-800 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 104 (1988); W. VA.
CODE § 60-1-4 (1992).
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bequest. When a state liquor licensing statute allows holders to trans-
fer licenses, holders have the opportunity to enter the marketplace
and obtain fair market value for the property interest.48 Federal
courts have looked at the transferability and market value of licenses
in determining whether state-created interests constitute property to
which a federal tax lien attaches.49 "[A] liquor license will constitute
property, within the meaning of federal law [for I.R.S. purposes], if
the license has beneficial value for its holder, and is sufficiently trans-
ferable."50 A transferable liquor license has "intrinsic worth that is
subject to bargain and sale in the marketplace. ' 51 Thus, the federal
courts regard transferable liquor licenses as personal property.
States have also used alienability to determine whether a liquor
license is a property interest. California, for example, has recognized
that a liquor license is a property right with the attributes of value and
assignability.52 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Saugen,53
also recognized that the license has monetary value due to its aliena-
bility, entitling the owner of a liquor business condemned through em-
48. Nelson v. Naranjo, 395 P.2d 228, 231 (N.M. 1964) ("'Where the [liquor licensing]
statute recognizes the right of transfer from one to another, and where the right is a valua-
ble right... the license or right to do business becomes a valuable property right."' (quot-
ing Deggender v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 83 P. 898, 899 (1906))); Boss Co. v.
Board of Comm'rs, 192 A.2d 584,587 (N.J. 1963) (holding that "the liquor license is a legal
interest in the nature of an economic asset ... and because it has monetary value and is
transferable, either by consent of the licensee or by operation of law ... it possesses the
qualities of property").
49. In re Terwilliger's Catering, 911 F.2d 1168, 1171 (6th Cir. 1990). Federal courts
have sometimes disagreed with a state's assessment of whether or not a liquor license is a
property interest. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951 F.2d 710, 714-15 (6th Cir.
1991) (federal courts must "look behind labels" given by the state to the license interest to
determine whether a license is property in a functional sense (citing Reed v. Village of
Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 1983))). In Brookpark Entertainment, the court
found that because Ohio allows a liquor license to be transferred, sold, inherited, and re-
newed, the liquor license has pecuniary value to its holder and is protected under the Due
Process Clause prior to its revocation. Id. at 716. The Brookpark court noted, however,
that its holding did not include the recognition of a property interest for a first-time liquor
license applicant. 1d. at 716, n.4.
50. Kimura v. Battley, 969 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1992). The ability to transfer a li-
cense is an important factor in determining whether the license has acquired the necessary
property characteristics, because it corresponds with the rights of ownership and gives the
license a market value. See Golden v. State, 285 P.2d 49, 52-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); see
also Harvey Levin, Economic and Regulatory Aspects of Liquor Licensing, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 785, 807-08 (1964).
51. Kimura, 969 F.2d at 811. See also Little v. United States, 704 F.2d 1100, 1105-06
(9th Cir. 1983) (pecuniary worth and transferability determine whether an asset is
property).
52. See, eg. Roehm v. Orange County, 196 P.2d 550,554 (Cal. 1948) (en banc) (finding
liquor license to be taxable property).
53. 169 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1969).
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inent domain to compensation. 4 Minnesota, however, typically does
not recognize a property interest in a liquor license for purposes other
than eminent domain. 5 This apparent inconsistency in Minnesota's
view of liquor licenses is not uncommon among the states. States dif-
fer widely, even within their own boundaries, as to whether a liquor
license is treated as property for all purposes. This difference of opin-
ion may be due to the fact that not all courts recognize that a license
has monetary value to a licensee who possesses a right to alienate the
license.56
There is wide variation in how states view the element of aliena-
bility and the corresponding property interest in the license. This vari-
ation exists because there are different reasons why a license might be
treated as an asset. For example, some courts treat the license as a
privilege in issues involving the relationship of the licensee to the gov-
ernment, and as property in issues involving the relationship of the
licensee to third parties, such as creditors or heirs. Further, the mone-
tary value created when a state allows the transfer of a liquor license
for compensation does not necessarily justify treating the license as
property for all purposes.5 7
In Pennsylvania a state statute provides that a liquor license can
be transferred upon the death of the licensee to the surviving spouse,
or personal representative, or a person designated by the licensee. 8
The courts in Pennsylvania, however, have consistently held that
under the Pennsylvania Liquor Code a liquor license is not property,
even though the license enhances the value of the licensee's business
and the state is required to pay compensation to the licensee in con-
54. Id at 40, 46.
55. Country Liquors, Inc. v. City Council of Minneapolis, 264 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn.
1978).
56. Saugen, 169 N.W.2d at 40. The Saugen court stated:
"This difference of opinion as to the legal nature of a liquor license is apparently
due to the fact, not always recognized by the courts, that such license, while a
mere privilege as far as the relation between the government and the licensee is
concerned, nevertheless constitutes a definite economic asset of monetary value
for its owner... It is submitted that wherever the legislature has made licenses
assignable or transferable, and the transfer can be effected with the consent of the
authorities to anyone qualifying under the statute, the property element in the
license is sufficiently recognized to warrant its exposure to seizure by the credi-
tors of the licensee."
Id. (quoting Annotation, 148 A.L.R. 492 (1944)).
57. Fulmer Supermarket, Inc. v. State Director, Dep't of Liquor Control, No. 88 AP-
26, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3789, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1988).
58. 47 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 468(a) (1994).
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demnation proceedings.5 9 New Mexico also limits the treatment of
liquor licenses as property by stating that there is no vested right in a
liquor license as against the State.60 Nevertheless, New Mexico law
states, "as against creditors of the licensee the license shall be consid-
ered property subject to execution, attachment, security transactions,
liens, receivership and any and all other incidents of tangible personal
property. 61
The right to alienate is an attribute that may be used to generate
property characteristics in a liquor license. Its use may be limited,
however, by state decisions which differentiate between the relation-
ship of the licensee to the government and the relationship of the li-
censee to third parties.
3. The Right To Renew
The third attribute, the right to renew, may also create a property
interest in the liquor license. The renewal procedure varies within
each state and most liquor licenses are valid for only one year. Some
states allow the licensee to renew without a formal reapplication.
These "perpetual" statutes give specific guidelines for renewal and al-
low rejection of renewal only upon "good cause."'6 In these jurisdic-
tions, the licensee comes to expect that the license will be renewed as
a matter of course.63 The perpetual renewal procedures provide for
abbreviated and expedited review processes, avoiding the rigid proce-
59. See 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Restaurant, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 202, 205
(E.D. Pa. 1985); see also In re Ryan's Estate, 99 A.2d 562, 563-64 (Pa. 1953) (holding that
the license was not an asset of the state and, therefore, state inheritance tax could not be
imposed on such a transfer to a surviving spouse since the license terminated upon the
death of the licensee, and the Liquor Control Board had the power to grant a new license
to the designated person).
60. N.M. STAT. AN. § 60-6A-19 (Michie 1993).
61. Chronis v. State, 670 P.2d 953, 956 (N.M. 1983).
62. For example, the Colorado renewal statute provides that the "licensing authority
may refuse to renew any license for good cause, subject to judicial review." COLO. REv.
STAT. § 12-47-106(b) (1991).
63. Bundo v. Walled Lake, 238 N.W.2d 154, 161 (Mich. 1976) (holding that when "the
statutory scheme for renewal of liquor licenses is geared to permit renewal of licenses to
take place as a matter of course ... the nature of an understanding exists that once a
license is granted a licensee will be permitted to operate for more than one year"); Reed v.
Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1983) (renewal of liquor license is a
property right). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (stating that an
employment contract which guarantees continued employment unless the employer shows
good cause for termination can amount to a legitimate claim of entitlement regardless of
whether the guarantee is stated or implied); Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951
F.2d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that liquor licenses can be considered a form of prop-
erty when they constitute a given entitlement, thus, "[a]n individual having 'present enjoy-
ment of the benefit and a claim of entitlement to its continuation under state law... [has] a
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dures required for initial license issuance. 64 In these states, renewal is
considered a continuation of the original liquor license and little, if
any, investigation or examination of the licensee is required.6' A per-
petual liquor license therefore may be characterized as property due
to the licensee's entitlement to renewal. 66 Where there is an expecta-
tion that a license will be renewed, the license acquires a greater prop-
erty interest due to the reliance that the license will be renewed.67
Other states follow a "provisional" renewal procedure, instead of
the "perpetual" renewal procedure. The provisional renewal scheme
requires holders to reapply each year for renewal.68 Provisional stat-
utes deny the licensee any expectation of automatic renewal.69 There-
property interest") (quoting 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA Er AL., TREAarSE ON CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.5 (1986)).
64. See ALA. CODE § 28-3A-5 (Supp. 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-47-106 (Supp.
1994); Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.29.2 (Anderson 1989).
65. Golden v. State, 285 P.2d 49, 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Saso v. Furtardo, 232 P.2d
583, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Scioto Trails Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 462
N.E.2d 1386, 1391 (Ohio 1983) (plaintiff's liquor license subject to automatic renewal pro-
visions unless precluded by local-option election).
66. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951 F.2d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 1991) (Ohio
liquor licensee has a property interest protected under the Due Process Clause since the
licensee holds a claim to license's continuation under state law); Bundo v. City of Walled
Lake, 238 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Mich. 1976) (holder of a liquor license in Michigan can assume
that there is a great likelihood that license will be renewed). But see Scioto Trails Co., 462
N.E.2d at 1391 (stating it is "well-established that a liquor permit is not property in the
traditional sense").
67. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Court states: "It is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined." Id. See Manos
v. City of Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40,49 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (tavern owner's business invest-
ment affected by city's refusal to renew liquor license, and existing understanding in this
situation is that once license is granted it will likely be renewed).
68. The "provisional" category is similar to the "probationary" status of an employee
who has only "an abstract concern in being rehired," not a property interest requiring a
hearing. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578 (1972). A liquor license with a provisional status specifi-
cally denies any expectation that a license will be renewed as a matter of course. For
example, the Illinois renewal statutes explicitly provide that no expectation of continued
renewal should be assumed and that the state has the right to change the qualifications for
renewal after the licensee has obtained the original license. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 235, para.
5/6-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Specifically, the code provides that "the renewal privilege herein
provided for shall not be construed as a vested right which shall ... prevent the city council
... from decreasing the number of licenses to be issued within its jurisdiction." Id. Like-
wise, the Georgia statute mandates that all liquor licenses "issued pursuant to this title
shall expire on December 31 of each year and application for renewal shall be made annu-
ally." GA. CODE ANN. § 3-2-7 (Harrison 1991).
69. See generally Chesser v. Johnson, 387 F.2d 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that
the requirements for a renewal applicant must be "considered under the standards of the
ordinance governing the matter" at the time the license is up for renewal). Bundo v.
Walled Lake, 238 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 1976); But see Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704
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fore, the licensee is not granted the "legitimate claim of entitlement"70
necessary to raise the license to the level of constitutionally protected
property.71 In Colorado, for example, liquor licenses expire annu-
ally,72 yet license holders may commit "their lives and their capital to
building their businesses" relying on license renewal.73 Regardless,
Colorado courts have held that such license holders have "acted at
their peril and assumed the risk that their licenses may not be re-
newed." 74 License holders, in states that follow a provisional renewal
scheme, do not have a reasonable expectation that their license will be
protected as property.
4. The State's Right to Revoke
The fourth and final attribute, the state's right to revoke, arises
from restrictions that statutes place on state actions in revocation
hearings. States often require different due process standards for rev-
ocation hearings than for issuance decisions. For example, rudimen-
tary due process requirements of adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard are necessary to revoke or suspend a liquor license in
Illinois.75 Prior to an issuance of a liquor license in Illinois, however,
no property right exists and the application procedure is not subject to
due process protection at all.76 Some states, on the other hand, apply
the same due process standards for both the issuance procedure and
the revocation procedure. In Georgia, for example, the local gov-
erning authority for liquor licenses is bound to follow the same due
F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1983) (renewal procedures in Illinois are so routine and uncom-
plicated they imply a legislative intent to renew most licenses, which results in a "property
right" entitled to due process protection).
70. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
71. Munden, supra note 29, at 1217-18. When a statute requires annual reapplication,
the only entitlement that the applicant can claim is that during the licensed period, the
licensee has the right to engage in the sale of liquor. Id. See State ex reL Garrett v. Ran-
dall, 527 S.W.2d 366, 373 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (holding that since applicant for renewal of
license had no property interest in a one year liquor license, failure to hold evidentiary
hearing was not denial of due process). But see ARO Sys., Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor
Control, 684 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that liquor licensee has a prop-
erty interest in a validly issued liquor license).
72. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-47-106(1)(a) (1994).
73. Ficarra v. Department of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 18 (Colo. 1993) (en
bane) (non-renewal of bail bondsman's license was not unconstitutional since he had no
vested right to renewal of inactive license).
74. Id (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Buckley, 213 P.2d 608, 612 (Colo. 1949)).
75. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 235, para. 5/7-5 (1994).
76. Ole, Ole, Inc. v. Kozubowski, 543 N.E.2d 178, 180-82 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that due process was not necessary for filing a local option referendum petition to restrict
future alcohol sales within the district).
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process guidelines set forth in the statute for "[t]he granting or refusal
and the suspension or revocation of the permits or licenses."7 7 The
level of procedural protection accorded the licensee at a revocation
hearing is a good indication of whether the state treats the interest as
a vested property right, or merely as an expectation of continued
entitlement.7
The presence of any of these four attributes indicates the exist-
ence of a sufficient property interest necessary to accord liquor
licenses due process protection. Although none of the attributes are
mandatory to a determination that the license is a property right,79
their presence encourages courts to find that the licensee's interest in
the liquor license has risen to the level of a constitutionally protected
property interest. These characteristics may also influence the level of
due process protection required for any state action. As the degree of
property like characteristics increases, the level of constitutional pro-
tection accorded the applicant or licensee also increases.
B. Extent of Procedural Due Process Protection Accorded Actions
Involving Liquor Licenses
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."80
The procedural due process implicated by the Due Process Clause
"assures appropriate notice, hearing, and an unbiased decisionmaker
before government deprives a person of certain protected interests."81
Because liquor licensing is regulated under statutory or constitutional
provisions,'n a state or local agency's refusal to issue licenses, or deci-
sions to revoke or to transfer a license, is a state action which may
77. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2(a) (Harrison 1991).
78. See Munden, supra note 29, at 1210-11. The greater the protection accorded for
revocation hearings, the more it appears that the state intended the interest in a liquor
license to be a vested property right. Contra Leafer v. State, 104 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. 1958)
(holding that because a license is not property and confers no vested interest, "it is at all
times revocable at the pleasure of the authority from which it emanates") (quoting State
ex. rel First Presbyterian Church v. Fuller, 187 So. 148, 150 (Fla. 1939)).
79. Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
although an Illinois liquor license could not be sold or bequested, it could be considered
property within the meaning of the due process clause).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. Asimow, supra note 27, at 1084; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative
State, 72 CAL. L. Rnv. 1044, 1109 (1984). It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss
federal due process in detail. For a comprehensive discussion of due process, see generally
L. TRNE, AMErRicAN CONSTIruoNAL LAW 663-768 (2d ed. 1988).
82. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
trigger a claim that the licensee has been deprived of procedural due
process. 8 3 Due process protection against state action requires that
the action impair a constitutionally protected "liberty" or "property"
interest.s4 The nature of the liquor license interest determines
whether due process is required at all,85 and, if so, the extent of the
process due and when it must be provided.8 6 In addition, "[a]lthough
the underlying substantial interest is created by 'an independent
source such as state law,' federal constitutional law determines
whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitle-
ment' protected by the Due Process Clause." s
The nature of the liquor license interest is defined by state and
local liquor licensing provisions and state court decisions interpreting
these provisions.88 Initially, some states attempted to circumvent due
process considerations by labeling the liquor license a "privilege"
rather than a "property interest."8 9 The Supreme Court rejected this
classification in Board of Regents v. Roth, reasoning that it is not the
label attached by the state, but the nature of the interest being de-
83. For purposes of this section procedural due process will generally be referred to as
"due process."
84. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Not everyone agrees with the Court's use of the terms "liberty" and
"property" for due process analysis. At least one commentator has suggested that instead
"the inquiry should focus on the fairness of the governmental action." Rubin, supra note
81, at 1047. California has also expanded procedural due process under the California
Constitution to make it more inclusive than federal due process. California considers free-
dom from arbitrary government action to be itself a liberty interest protected by due pro-
cess. Asimow, supra note 27, at 1086 n.57 (citing People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627
(Cal. 1979) (refusing to follow federal constitutional law)).
85. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.
86. Asimow, supra note 27, at 1085 n.52 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
347-49 (1976)).
87. Hoo Chung v. Blase, No. 86-C13012, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11859 at *9 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 17, 1987) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)).
88. States were given control over liquor licensing under the 'Iventy-first Amendment.
See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. Deprivation of a "liberty interest" also re-
quires due process protection. A liberty interest has been broadly defined to include,
among other rights, the right to contract and to "engage in any of the common occupations
of life." Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
Thus, liberty rights could be implicated if a liquor license owner was forced to discontinue
his business due to state action. Nevertheless, this Article focuses only on the property
interest aspect of due process deprivation rather than addressing state action involving
liquor licenses as affecting a liberty interest.
89. See Kicklighter v. City of Jesup, 135 S.E.2d 890, 892 (Ga. 1964); Ole, Ole, Inc. v.
Kozubowski, 543 N.E.2d 178, 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); State er reL Carman v. Ross, 162
S.W. 702, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914); Gas 'N Shop, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control
Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Neb. 1988); State v. Bush, 253 S.W.2d 269, 272-73 (Tex.
1952).
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prived, that must be considered in determining whether due process is
required. 0 The Court looked to state law to determine whether a li-
quor license should be considered property for due process pur-
poses.91 Courts, in determining the nature of the interest, typically
focus on the property characteristics of the liquor license 92 rather than
any liberty interest.93 Finally, a few states ignore the definitional anal-
ysis used in Roth, and instead afford due process protection as a mat-
ter of fairness.94
If the interest in a liquor license rises to the level of a protected
liberty or property interest under federal constitutional law, the court
must decide what procedures are required to satisfy due process and
whether these procedures have been satisfied.95 The level of due pro-
cess required in a particular situation will depend on the nature of the
property interest affected and the type of state action involved.96 The
concept of due process is flexible and "calls for such procedural pro-
tections as the particular situation demands.197
90. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.
91. IdL at 577.
92. See supra notes 24-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of attributes of a
liquor license used to determine property interest.
93. In Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1986), however, the
court analyzed the allegation of a due process violation based on the deprivation of a
property interest in the liquor license itself, as well as a deprivation of the liberty interest in
being allowed to sell liquor as an occupation. "Liberty," as used in the due process clause,
includes:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
94. Berry v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934, 944 (D. Wyo. 1976) (pro-
tectable interest may be small because there is no property right in obtaining an initial
liquor license, but plaintiff is entitled to have initial application treated fairly); Manos v.
City of Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40, 50 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (society's interest in insuring that
liquor licenses are not arbitrarily revoked entitles license holder to minimal standards of
procedural due process, even though property interest is not enough to entitle holder to
renewal); People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622,627 (Cal. 1979) (freedom from arbitrary adjudi-
cative procedures is itself a liberty interest protected by due process).
95. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,542-43 (1985) (pretermination
notice and opportunity to be heard required to satisfy due process prior to terminating an
educational employee).
96. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (pretermination hearing required to
satisfy due process when welfare payments are discontinued).
97. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.98 De-
termining the extent of procedural requirements, and whether a hear-
ing must take place before a person is deprived of a protected liberty
or property interest, requires the weighing of three factors: 1) the im-
portance of the interest involved; 2) the value of the procedural safe-
guards to that interest; and 3) the burden on the government entity
providing the hearing.99
In analyzing the first factor, the importance of the interest in-
volved, the four property attributes discussed earlier °° influence the
level of due process required for state action affecting licensing ac-
tions. As to the second factor, the value of the procedural safeguards,
the opportunity to receive notice and a hearing may be critical to ob-
taining or retaining a liquor license.10 1 Third, the burden on the gov-
ernment entity of providing notice and a hearing will likely depend on
the procedural structure of the licensing function. Most states, how-
ever, will likely find it less burdensome to accommodate procedural
notice and hearing requirements during licensing actions than to deal
with the litigation following an erroneous deprivation. °
States which have addressed the due process issue through their
state liquor licensing provisions and through court decisions interpret-
ing these provisions, vary as to the level of due process accorded. For
those states which have not yet determined the level of due process
required for liquor licenses, an examination of the four property at-
tributes discussed above0 3 will help determine the due process pro-
tection the state should provide the licensee, or potential licensee,
either by judicial decision or legislative action. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to analyze each of the states and their current view as to
due process protection afforded liquor licenses. Instead, representa-
tive state examples will be discussed to illustrate how property charac-
98. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
99. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. See Greco v. Guss, 775 F2d 161, 170-72 (7th Cir. 1985),
for an example of how a court might determine whether a post-deprivation remedy satis-
fies the due process required when the failure to renew a liquor license causes the depriva-
tion of a property right.
100. See supra notes 24-79 and accompanying text.
101. Hoo Chung v. Blase, No. 86-C3012 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11859, at *12-*13 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 17, 1987).
102. Id. at 13 (cost of pre-deprivation hearing probably less than costs of an appeal to
the Illinois Liquor Control Commission).
103. See supra notes 24-79 and accompanying text, discussing the right to obtain, the
right to transfer, the right to renew, and revocability.
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teristics have determined whether, and to what extent, procedural due
process is provided.
1. Due Process Required Because Liquor License is a Property Interest
States that consider liquor licenses to be property require full
constitutional protection for all licensing actions. Full constitutional
protection requires that a pre-deprivation hearing and the opportunity
to be heard be given every time a licensee's interest in the liquor li-
cense is impacted.0 4
Colorado, for example, classifies the liquor license as a property
interest entitling the licensee to full due process protection. 0 5 An ex-
amination of the four property attributes confirms that Colorado's li-
censing provisions create a vested property right. First, while the
number of licenses issued is not limited, the right to obtain a license is
limited by the state licensing authority's discretion to deny an applica-
tion if "in its opinion licenses already granted for the particular local-
ity are adequate for the reasonable needs of the community."'1 6 This
scheme, which gives the state discretionary authority to determine
how many licenses should be issued, creates more property character-
istics in the license than are created in states where licenses are issued
in unlimited numbers. This scheme does, however, create less prop-
erty interests than in those jurisdictions which statutorily limit the
number of licenses issued.1 °7
The right to alienate a Colorado liquor license also indicates the
existence of a property interest, since the licensing authority must al-
low transfers where certain statutory qualifications are met.0 8 Colo-
rado liquor licenses also have monetary value.10 9 A Colorado licensee
has a high expectation of renewal, which can be classified as a perpet-
ual interest, because the licensing authority can only refuse to renew if
104. Munden, supra note 29, at 1204-05.
105. Mr. Lucky's, Inc. v. Dolan, 591 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Colo. 1979) (holding that a liquor
license is viewed as a property right subject to due process protection); A.D. Jones & Co. v.
Parsons, 319 P.2d 480, 483 (Colo. 1957); Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d
1323, 1326 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Price Haskel, Inc. v. Denver Dep't of Excise and
Licenses, 694 P.2d 364, 366 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
106. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-108 (West 1992); MacArthur v. Sanzalone, 225
P.2d 1044, 1045 (Colo. 1950) (wide discretion granted to local agencies regarding liquor
license issuance).
107. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
108. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-106(4)(c) (West 1992).
109. "A liquor license.., is a valuable and personal right." Bullock v. Cayot, 501 P.2d
147, 149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis added) (liquor license was part of consideration
received by defendant for amount paid on lease of premises from plaintiff).
it can show "good cause." 110 Finally, the license can only be revoked
or suspended upon certain conditions, and specific procedural require-
ments must be satisfied by the licensing authority."' These attributes
all contribute to the conclusion that a Colorado liquor license is
property.
California also recognizes a vested property interest in a liquor
license.1'2 Unlike Colorado, California imposes a statutory quota on
the issuance of new licenses within the state. 1 3 This restrictive limita-
tion on the right to obtain a license generates a high level of property
characteristics in the license. 1 4 The right to alienate a license in Cali-
fornia also increases the level of property rights held by a licensee,
because the liquor license's value is recognized and the license can be
sold commercially." 5 Similar to Colorado, the right to renew a license
in California generates a perpetual interest because the licensee ex-
pects automatic reapproval from the licensing authority." 6 The li-
censing authority, however, is given broad discretion to revoke or
suspend a license when it decides that "the continuance of a license
110. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-106(1)(b) (West 1992).
111. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-110(1) (West 1992); A.D. Jones & Co. v. Parsons,
319 P.2d 480,483 (Colo. 1957) (holding that a license is "revocable during the year only for
breach of the conditions upon which it was issued").
112. Dash, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 683 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("Under California law, a liquor license issued pursuant to the Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Act is a valuable property right"). California courts have impliedly recognized
that full due process must be accorded liquor licensing applicants. Munden, supra note 29,
at 1236-38. See, e.g., Walsh v. Kirby, 529 P.2d 33, 42 (Cal. 1974); Cooper v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 290 P.2d 914, 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. 582,588 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981).
113. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23817 (West 1993) (limiting the issuance to one license
per 2000 inhabitants of a county).
114. See supra notes 45, 46 and accompanying text.
115. Golden v. State, 285 P.2d 49,52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (a liquor license can be trans-
ferred upon board approval and can be given value and sold commercially). The buying
and selling of liquor licenses is big business in California. Marc Lacey, Liquor in Los
Angeles; Can Prohibition-Era Laws Handle Today's Problems?, L.A. TImEs, Dec. 14, 1992,
at A14. This article illustrates the profitability of the license resale business. Art Rodri-
quez, after the conviction of Soon Ja Du on manslaughter charges for shooting Latasha
Harlins, contacted Soon Ja Du and informed her of a state law that prohibits "convicted
criminals from holding liquor licenses." Id. He purchased the license, as he has similarly
done "with equal swiftness" after the L.A. riots. Id. "While the city was still on edge, he
took to the phones trying to snatch up the licenses of those places that had burned to the
ground." Id. The result of this type of activity coupled with the system, initially created to
clean up after prohibition, is that California liquor licenses can be "bought and sold on the
open market for five, 10, even 20 times the state's $6,000 selling price." Id.
116. "[R]enewal is deemed a continuation of the original license." Golden, 285 P.2d at
52.
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would be contrary to public welfare or morals."'1 17 Regardless of this
discretionary leeway, the high level of property characteristics demon-
strated by the first three attributes establishes that a California liquor
licensee can expect to receive full constitutional due process when li-
censing actions impair this personal property interest.118
2. Due Process Required By Type of Licensing Action At Issue and By
Legislative Mandate
The majority of states provide some due process protection by
legislating the procedural processes which must be accorded to licen-
sees and by differentiating the various licensing actions such as issu-
ance, renewal, and revocation. Liquor licenses may not rise to the
level of property required for due process rights to be granted for all
purposes. Many states, however, by statute or decision, grant limited
due process protection for certain licensing actions such as renewal or
revocation. 119 In those states, the legislature has determined that the
liquor license is an interest requiring due process protection for cer-
tain actions. Nevertheless, an analysis of the four property attributes
is relevant to decide whether the state statute provides sufficient due
process for the interest at stake. In states granting limited due process
by judicial decision, such decisions differentiate due process require-
ments based upon an analysis of property attributes or the type of
licensing action at issue.
Georgia and Alabama are examples of states which grant due
process protection by statute. In Georgia, the legislature specified
due process guidelines for issuance, refusal, suspension, or revocation
of a liquor license, but refused to recognize the existence of a property
interest in the license. 120 An analysis of the four property attributes
117. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24200(a) (West 1993).
118. California has recognized the existence of a property interest by declaring that a
liquor license is "property" within the Civil Code section defining property and things sub-
ject to ownership. Golden, 285 P.2d at 52.
119. E.g., S & S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 736 (R.I. 1985) ("A liquor
license, although not property in the strict legal sense, 'is regarded as having some aspect
of a property right that protects the possessor from arbitrary action by the local licensing
board."' (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Soe'y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124, 129 &
n.5 (R.I. 1974) (dictum)).
120. Under section 3-3-2, the issuance of liquor licenses or permits must "be in accord-
ance with the following guidelines of due process ... ." GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2(b) (1993).
While some due process concerns are guaranteed to liquor licensees, section 3-3-2 has not
been construed to create a constitutionally protected property interest. Cheek v. Gooch,
779 F.2d 1507, 1508-09 (11th Cir. 1986) (refusal to issue any licenses is not subject to proce-
dural guidelines because applicant does not have a property interest in the opportunity to
acquire a liquor license, and local unit's failure to establish standards for granting a license
supports Georgia's limited, but extant due process protection. Gov-
erning authorities in Georgia have complete discretion in deciding
who may obtain a liquor license, with no limitations on the number of
retail liquor licenses issued.'21 As noted above, this type of issuance
scheme does not indicate that the interest received is protectable and
valuable. Therefore, the liquor license under Georgia law has few
property characteristics. The right to alienate a license has also been
severely, although not completely, limited in Georgia.122 Regardless,
both the right to renew and the revocability attributes of a Georgia
liquor license offer some expectation of a protected property interest.
Furthermore, a statutory provision requires that due process guide-
lines be followed in the granting, refusal, suspension, or revocation of
a license.123
Alabama also grants limited due process protection to licensees
by statute.1 24 The license, much like in Georgia, has few property
characteristics. The right to obtain a license in Alabama is discretion-
ary,'1 with no limit on the number of licenses that can be issued. 26
The right to alienate is also limited; the licensing code mandates that
licenses may not be assigned and can only be transferred within the
same jurisdiction upon the board's approval. 27 This limited right to
does not violate due process rights); McCollum v. City of Powder Springs, 720 F. Supp. 985,
988 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Johnson v. Brown, 584 F. Supp. 510,512 (M.D. Ga. 1984); Scoggins v.
Moore, 579 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 747 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1984).
121. See supra note 40.
122. There is no provision in the Georgia statutes allowing a licensee to transfer his
license. Section 3-2-3 of the Georgia code provides that whenever the licensee is no longer
in the retail liquor business, the license may be denied, suspended, or cancelled. GA. CODE
ANN. § 3-2-3(1)(c) (1993); see also Allen v. Carter, 177 S.E.2d 245,246 (Ga. 1970) (holding
that "the city of Columbus had a discretion to grant or withhold from the applicants their
approval of the proposed transfer of a city license to sell spirituous liquors"); Shan-
nondoah, Inc. v. Smith, 230 S.E.2d 351, 352 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (citing a city of Atlanta
ordinance which prevented a liquor licensee from transferring his rights under the license
to another).
123. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2-3, 3-3-2 (1993). Under section 3-3-2, the revocation of a
license can only occur based upon "ascertainable standards" which must be set in the local
licensing ordinance. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2(b)(1) (1993). Atlanta Code of Ordinances,
section 5-48 provides for revocation only when "due cause" for such an action has been
shown. Atlanta Attractions, Inc. v. Massell, 330 F. Supp. 865, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (revoca-
tion involves state action and requires Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process).
124. See ArA. CODE § 28-3A-23 (1992); Potts v. Bennett, 487 So.2d 919, 923 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that "an applicant for an off-premises beer license must [not] be given
any more due process than is required by the AAPA and the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing
Code").
125. "The board is granted discretionary powers in acting upon license applications
under the provisions of this chapter." ALA. CODE § 28-3A-3(b) (1992).
126. ALA. CODE § 28-3A-23(e) (1994).
127. ALA. CODE § 28-3A-23(k) (1994).
Winter 19951 REGULATION OF LIQUOR LICENSING
464 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:441
alienate indicates a low level of property interest in a Georgia liquor
license, particularly when coupled with the lack of protection against
revocation provided to the licensee.12 Yet, a licensee's right to renew
receives some protection because the Alabama statute requires the
state to prove "good cause" for denying a renewal.129 In Alabama,
the limited right to alienate and the limited protection afforded
against the state's right to revoke, indicate that the liquor license is
not a property interest. Nonetheless, the state, by statute, provides
limited due process protection to liquor licensees.
States may also grant limited due process protection through judi-
cial decision. This protection may extend to some, but not all licens-
ing actions. Courts have examined the type of licensing action and the
property attributes associated with such an action to determine
whether there is an interest requiring protection. New Jersey statutes,
for example, provide that a liquor license is not property. 3 0 New
Jersey case law supports this legislative pronouncement, holding that a
liquor license is not a contract or a property right, it is a permit or
privilege to pursue an otherwise illegal occupation.' 3' Nevertheless,
judicial decisions involving federal issues have required due process.
For instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Boss Co. v. Board of
Commissioners,132 held that a liquor license is "property" within the
meaning of section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, allowing the
attachment of a federal lien.133 The court looked beyond the legisla-
tive language of the state Alcoholic Beverage Law and examined the
attributes of the license itself.'3 The court concluded that the license
possessed the qualities of property because the license had monetary
value to the licensee and was transferable.'35 The court's holding was
128. "The board shall have the full right and authority to suspend any retail license
issued by it for any reason which it may deem sufficient and proper." ALA. CODE § 28-3A-
24(a) (1992).
129. ALA. CODE § 28-3A-5(b) (1992).
130. N.J. Rnv. STAT. § 33:1-26 (1992).
131. Sea Girt Restaurant v. Borough of Sea Girt, 625 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (D.NJ. 1986)
(citing Butler Oak Tavern v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Div., 120 A.2d 24,29 (N.J. 1956);
Mazza v. Cavicchia, 105 A.2d 545,548-49 (NJ. 1954); G. & J.K. Enters. Inc. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 500 A.2d 43, 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Gober v.
Township Comm. of Pemberton, 448 A.2d 516, 522 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982)).
132. 192 A.2d 584 (N.J. 1963).
133. ld. at 588.
134. Sea Girt, 625 F. Supp. at 1487 (citing Boss Co., 192 A2d at 586).
135. Boss Co., 192 A.2d at 587. The Court stated:
This license has value-not merely the personal value to the licensee that inheres
in the right to engage in the business of selling intoxicating liquors, but also the
monetary value that arises from the power possessed by the licensee to substitute,
with the municipal consent, some other person in his place as licensee .... Thus,
bolstered by the existence of state statutes that provided that once a
liquor license was granted, it would be protected against arbitrary rev-
ocation, suspension, or refusal to renew.136
A federal district court in New Jersey subsequently held that "a
New Jersey liquor license is an interest in property for purposes of
federal due process analysis" because it has economic value, is capable
of being transferred, and is protected against arbitrary suspension,
revocation, or refusal to renew.137 The district court noted that its
decision posed a potential conflict with the "well-established relation-
ship between the state and local government and the licensee, as de-
fined by statute and developed by case law."'1 38 The district court also
emphasized that its "holding that a license is property subject to fed-
eral due process protection in no way undermines the established
state licensing scheme.' 3 9
Michigan courts have historically stressed that a liquor license
creates no vested property rights.14° Recent Michigan decisions, how-
ever, differentiate between cases involving the right to obtain a license
and the right to renew a license.' 4' Due process protection has been
granted to licensees seeking to renew, but not to applicants seeking to
obtain a license. 42 Michigan statutorily limits the number of licenses
the liquor license is a legal interest in the nature of an economic asset, created
and protected by statute, and because it has monetary value and is transferable,
either by consent of the licensee or by operation of law.. . it possesses the quali-
ties of property.
Id at 586-87.
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-22, 33:1-31 (West Supp. 1985); Blanck v. Mayor & Bor-
ough Council of Magnolia, 185 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1962).
137. Sea Girt, 625 F. Supp. at 1487-88 (citing Blanck, 185 A.2d at 862).
138. Id, at 1487-88 n.4 (citing Boss, 192 A.2d at 598).
139. Id at 1488 & n.4.
140. Gamble v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 36 N.W.2d 297, 298 (Mich. 1949) (liquor li-
cense creates no vested property rights and may be revoked without violating due process);
Johnson v. Liquor Control omm'n, 254 N.W. 557, 559 (Mich. 1934) (liquor license is not
property within constitutional provision against depriving any person of property without
due process of law); People v. Schafran, 134 N.W. 29, 31 (Mich. 1912) (no vested property
right in a license to sell intoxicating liquors).
141. See Bundo v. City of Walled Lake,238 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Mich. 1976) ("The proce-
dure for obtaining a new license and that for renewing an existing license are quite
different").
142. Compare Bisco's, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 238 N.W.2d 166, 167
(Mich. 1976) (individual's seeking renewal of class C liquor license has an interest in prop-
erty such that he is entitled to due process protection once license has been issued and
expenditures have been made in reliance on it) with Bundo, 238 N.W.2d at 161 (license
renewed as a matter of course between 1968 and 1971 gave licensee a property interest
which entitled him to due process protection) and Wong v. City of Riverview, 337 N.W.2d
589, 590 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holder of liquor license has due process rights as to guide-
lines or standards governing decision whether or not to renew liquor license, but not as to
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which can be issued.143 This limitation is not considered sufficient in-
dication of the existence of a property right to justify requiring due
process protection for the issuance process itself.144 The Michigan
Supreme Court, however, held that the right to renew is a perpetual
interest that creates a property right requiring due process because
the Michigan licensing practice provides for "renewal of licenses to
take place as a matter of course in most instances."'145
Wisconsin courts have actually specified the procedural frame-
work required when a liquor license is revoked. In Manos v. City of
Green Bay,'4 the district court emphasized that a municipality must
provide a tavern owner or licensee with certain procedural safeguards
prior to revoking a liquor license. 47 Notwithstanding a recognition of
property rights at revocation, Wisconsin law does not provide due
process protection for liquor license applicants because courts have
found that the Wisconsin statute for licensing does not create a prop-
erty interest in a liquor license."4
guidelines required under due process for decisions as to whether or not to issue license to
first-time applicants).
143. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 436.19(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (licenses are limited to
one license for each fifteen hundred (1,500) of population); Alexander v. Michigan Liquor
Control Comm'n, 192 N.W.2d 505, 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (clarifying that the above
provision "that no public license shall be granted for sale of alcoholic liquor for consump-
tion on premises in excess of one license for each 1,500 of population or major fraction
thereof does not mean one license for each 1,500 of population on a statewide basis, but
rather refers to allocation of licenses according to population of local governmental
units").
144. Shamie v. City of Pontiac, 620 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1980).
145. Bundo, 238 N.W.2d at 161. "[O]ne who seeks a renewal of a liquor license has a
vested property right which requires a due process hearing." Barr v. Pontiac City Comm'n,
282 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
146. 372 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
147. Id at 51.
[Tihe municipality must provide the tavern owner or licensee with (1) notice
of the charges upon which denial of the liquor license is predicated, (2) an oppor-
tunity to respond to and challenge such charges, (3) an opportunity to present
witnesses under oath, (4) an opportunity to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses under oath, and (5) the opportunity to have a verbatim, written tran-
script made upon his own initiative and expense. In addition, the conclusions
made by the hearing body must be based on the evidence adduced at the hearing.
Id
148. Bayview-Lofberg's, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 905 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding that Milwaukee Municipal ordinance also did not support the creation of a prop-
erty interest since it did not establish substantive criteria which, if met, automatically enti-
tled the applicant to a license (citing Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338, 340 (7th
Cir. 1986))).
3. Due Process Not Required Because Liquor License is Not a
Property Interest
Most states provide that licensees be given some due process con-
sideration when state action affects a liquor license interest. A state
that refuses to extend such constitutional protection, however, usually
does so because it refuses to recognize the license as a constitutionally
protected property interest for the action at issue.'4 9 In Illinois, for
example, a liquor license is commonly found to be a privilege rather
than a property right.150 Illinois courts have held that an applicant for
a liquor license does not have a constitutionally protected right to ob-
tain a liquor license.151 Although the State Commission has a duty to
issue a retailer's license to an applicant who has conformed with all
statutory and local requirements for obtaining a liquor license,152 ap-
plicants have no vested right to obtain a license. 3 This contrasts with
other states where statutes express substantive criteria for the issuance
of the license and where liquor licenses are considered property
interests. 54
149. Berry v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934, 942 (D. Wyo. 1976) (cit-
ing State ex reL Noble v. City Council of Cheyenne, 52 P. 975 (Wyo. 1898)) (Wyoming state
law provides that there is "no vested right in any person to have a liquor license."); see
also Fulmer Supermarket, Inc. v. State, No. 88AP-26, 1988 WL 96210, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 1988) (noting that Ohio Supreme Court has twice held that liquor licenses are not
contracts or property); Ahmad v. City of Milwaukee, 478 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
("In Wisconsin 'a liquor license is a privilege and terming it a right is considered to be
against public policy."' (quoting Moedern v. McGinnis, 236 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1975))). But see Country Liquors, Inc. v. City Council of Minneapolis, 264 N.W.2d
821, 826 (Minn. 1978) (stating that "under Minnesota law there is no property right in a
liquor license" but also noting that there might be a "tacit property right in an existing
license.., for due process purposes"); State v. Saugen, 169 N.W.2d 37, 46 (Minn. 1969)
(although a liquor license is only a privilege as to licensing authorities, it is a property right
for purposes of eminent domain compensation); Tavern League of Wisconsin v. City of
Madison, 389 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (liquor license is a valuable property
right requiring minimum due process when a license is not issued due to nonpayment of
taxes).
150. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, para. 119 (1985); Sapir v. City of Chicago, 749 F. Supp. 187,
190 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Black Knight Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Oak Forest, 513 N.E.2d 109,
111 (I. App. Ct. 1987) (stating that "under Illinois law, a license is not a property right");
'Two Kats, Inc. v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 497 N.E.2d 1314, 1315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986);
Malito v. Marcin 303 N.E.2d 262, 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
151. Mirshak v. Joyce, 652 F. Supp. 359, 366 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (citing Jacobsen v. Illinois
Liquor Control, 423 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)).
152. ILL. AD~MI. CODE tit. 235, § 5/3-14 (1993).
153. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. But see Mirshak, 652 F. Supp. at 367
& n.7 (holding that applicant for a liquor license in Chicago has a property right for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment based on Chicago's Municipal Code, while not reach-
ing the question of whether an applicant has a property right under Illinois law).
154. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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The right to alienate a liquor license in Illinois is also limited.
The legislature has specifically stated that a license shall not be "sub-
ject to attachment, garnishment or execution, nor shall it be alienable
or transferable, voluntarily or involuntarily, or subject to being en-
cumbered or hypothecated."' 5 This limited right to alienate an Illi-
nois liquor license decreases the degree to which the license can be
considered a property interest. The Illinois statutory right to renew
guidelines also suggest that the property interest in a liquor license is
low or nonexistent because the license is treated as merely provisional
in nature. 6 Nevertheless, a few courts have concluded that a licen-
see's interest in renewal is property for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 7
The State's right to revoke an Illinois license is limited by statu-
tory law requiring notice and a hearing before a license is revoked or
suspended.'58 This procedural scheme suggests that the license might
be characterized as a property interest for other purposes as well.
However, since three out of the four attributes indicate that liquor
licenses are not property in Illinois, it is not surprising that the major-
ity of Illinois court decisions do not grant due process protection to
liquor licensees unless provided for by statute.5 9
155. IL. ADmrN. CODE tit. 235, § 5/6-1 (1993). However, the statutory scheme does
permit the purchaser of a bankrupt business to acquire the license if he is otherwise quali-
fied. See ILr. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 119 (1985); Schechter v. Village of Niles, No. 86-
C4683, 1989 WL 103380, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1989).
156. The statute code section also explicitly states that the right to renew does not give
a licensee any vested right and shall not prevent the licensing authorities from "decreasing
the number of licenses to be issued within its jurisdiction." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, para.
119 (1985).
157. See Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
that Illinois liquor licensee's interest in renewal is property for purposes of due process);
Hoo Chung v. Blase, No. 86-C3012,1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11859, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17,
1987) (licensee has a property interest in renewal of liquor license); supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text. Most Illinois courts have declined to follow these decisions, finding
that they "directly [contradict] controlling Illinois law." Black Knight Restaurant, Inc. v.
City of Oak Forest, 513 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
158. The revocation statute grants the licensee some due process rights such as the right
to a hearing, an opportunity to appear and defend, and the right to not have a license
revoked without cause. ILL. A.IM. CODE tit. 235, § 5/7-5 (1993).
159. See Black Knight Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Oak Forest, 513 N.E.2d 109, 112 (ill.
App. Ct. 1987); Bec-N-Call, Inc. v. Village of Steger, 394 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979).
It is well-established under Illinois law that a license to sell alcoholic beverages is
a privilege, not a property right, and thus, is not subject to due process protec-
tions.... In our view, the Reed court's conclusion directly contradicts controlling
Illinois law, and we decline to follow it as precedent.
Black Knight Restaurant Inc., 513 N.E2d at 111 (citing Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704
F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 1983). In Reed, the court "looked behind" the state label and de-
C. Determination of Whether Procedural Due Process Rights Are
Violated
Once a court determines that the liquor license is a constitution-
ally protected liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the extent of due process it must receive, the court
must then determine whether the appropriate level of procedural due
process has been provided to the liquor licensee. 60 Revocation or
failure to renew a license may require notice and hearing.161 Many
courts, however, find that a license application can be denied without
notice or hearing without violating due process. 62 Courts probably
distinguish between these actions based on the applicant's lower ex-
pectation of receiving the initial license, and the current licensee's reli-
ance interest in renewal or in avoiding revocation of an existing
license.
Other actions involving liquor licenses, such as zoning referen-
dums, petition procedures, and local-option elections, also implicate
procedural due process concerns. In the District of Columbia, for ex-
ample, liquor licenses are obtained by a petition procedure.163 The
District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board must deny
the application if a majority of registered voters within 600 feet of the
license applicant object to the issuance of a license.164 In Benel, Inc. v.
cided that a liquor license in Illinois was property within the meaning of federal tax lien
law. Reed, 704 F.2d at 948; see Sapir v. City of Chicago, 749 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Hornstein v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 106 N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ill. 1952); Ole,
Ole, Inc. v. Kozubowski, 543 N.E.2d 178, 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Malito v. Marcin, 303
N.E.2d 262, 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that issuance of liquor licenses not given due
process protection); Golden Egg Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 260 N.E.2d
329, 330-331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) ("[R]ight to sell liquor is a privilege subject to proper
regulation, which includes the discretion of the Commission to revoke that privilege."); see
also City of Wyoming v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 362 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977).
160. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
161. See Hoo Chung v. Blase, No. 86-C3012,1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11859, at *13 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 17, 1987); Schechter v. Village of Niles, No. 86-C4683, 1989 WL 103380, at *2
(N.D. fI1. Aug. 28, 1989).
162. See Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951 F.2d 710, 714-16 (6th Cir. 1992);
Mirshak v. Joyce, 652 F. Supp. 359, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (court found a property right, but
summary judgment motion based on alleged delay in approval of application for license
cannot be granted without more support for plaintiff's conclusion that such delay was a
deprivation of due process).
163. D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-115(e) (1992); see also CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-39(c)
(West Supp. 1994) (ten local residents may file a remonstrance "containing any objections
to the suitability of [an] applicant or proposed place of business").
164. Benel, Inc. v. Barry, No. 88-3413, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9692, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug.
15, 1989).
REGULATION OF LIQUOR LICENSING
.vwWinter 19951
Winter 1995]
470 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:441
Barry,165 the court concluded that the license was a property interest
that required due process protection. It then determined that the pe-
tition procedure, which delegated authority to citizens, did not violate
due process. 66
The referendum process, used in New Jersey to allow municipali-
ties to set hours during which alcoholic beverages may be sold, 67 has
also been challenged as violating procedural due process. The court in
Sea Girt Restaurant v. Borough of Sea Girt,'" held that this "referen-
dum procedure... constitutes a fair process of decision-making and
consequently does not violate procedural due process."' 69 In arriving
at its decision, the court explained that some due process procedures
were required because an increase or decrease in the number of hours
a liquor outlet was allowed to operate would affect the value of the
property interest held by the liquor licensee. 7 ° The court found the
voters to be appropriate decisionmakers because they were "affected
on a day-to-day basis by the hours of operation" of liquor outlets, and
could "balance the problems created by alcohol consumption, such as
drunk driving, with the inconvenience of having to travel outside their
community to purchase liquor.'' 1  The procedure provided by the
referendum statute gave those opposed to a change in the liquor sale
hours a minimum of 30 days notice to make full use of the campaign
process to place their position before the voters.72 The court found
that the plaintiffs in this case had made full use of this opportunity and
were afforded procedural due process.'73
Local-option elections' 74 have also been challenged as violations
of procedural due process, 175 but have generally been upheld as valid
165. Id at *7-8.
166. Id. at *20.
167. N.J. STAT. Am. § 33:1-47.1 (West 1992).
168. 625 F. Supp. 1482 (D.N.J. 1986).
169. Id. at 1491.
170. Id at 1490.
171. Id at 1490-91.
172. Id. at 1491.
173. Id
174. A local option law, with respect to intoxicating liquors, authorizes a subdivision of
a state to determine whether to adopt a restrictive or prohibitive liquor licensing law within
its locality. See Ohio ex rel Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904). This determination is
not made by traditional legislative enactment but is instead carried out by popular vote of
the people. Id
175. Local-option elections have also been challenged as violations of substantive due
process and equal protection. See, id at 448-50. These challenges will be addressed in
section IV.
exercises of police power. 76 The Seventh Circuit, for example, ex-
amined the local-option election in Philly's v. Byrne, 77 where citizens
voted to make the precinct "dry" under Illinois' local-option liquor
law. As a result of this vote, any license to sell liquor in the precinct
automatically lapsed 30 days after the election. 78 The licensees who
lost their licenses as a result of the referendum alleged that they were
deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 179 Judge Posner explained in the majority
opinion that because the referendum is a legislative procedure, notice
and opportunity for a hearing is not required, and, therefore, the
licensees were not denied procedural due process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 80
Ohio state court decisions have held that the termination of li-
quor licenses as a result of local-option elections do not violate either
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the United States or
Ohio Constitutions, "even though there is no provision for specific
notice to the potentially affected permit holder prior to the holding of
the local-option election."'181 The Ohio court in Fulmer Supermarket,
Inc. v. State, 82 compared the local-option election to a referendum
and noted that the underlying principals were the same since
"[l]egislative acts by the people are to be controlled and construed by
the same principles as are applied to legislative acts of the state legis-
lature." 83 In a recent Sixth Circuit decision, however, the court held
that Ohio's local-option law violated procedural due process on its
face because it allowed voters to cancel a liquor license without the
necessary procedural safeguards to protect the licensee's interest. 184
176. Replogle v. Commonwealth of Penn., 523 A.2d 327, 331 (Pa. 1987).
177. 732 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1984).
178. Id at 89.
179. Id
180. Id. at 93 (stating that "although the appellants did not have notice or an opportu-
nity for a hearing in the sense familiar in adjudicative proceedings, they of course had
ample notice of the forthcoming election and an opportunity to campaign against the prop-
osition that the precinct should vote itself dry").
181. Rickard v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 504 N.E.2d 724, 725 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986); Fulmer Supermarket, Inc. v. State, No. 88 AP-26, 1988 WL 96210, at *10-*11 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1988) (stating that local-option elections do not violate due process since
"plaintiff's complaint that he [sic] had no specific notice of the impending local-option
election is no different from a contention that it did not receive specific notice of a pro-
posed act, subsequently adopted by any other legislative body, such as a city council or the
state legislature").
182. 1988 WL 96210 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1988).
183. Id. at *14-*15.
184. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 68 (1992).
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Procedural due process is violated when a statutory procedure
outlining the process required for a licensing action has not been fol-
lowed, or when a court determines that sufficient notice and hearing
have not been provided for an action affecting a protected property
interest. Challenges to referendum processes or local-option elections
may also violate due process unless the court determines that the ac-
tion is legislative in nature.
D. Protection of Liquor Licenses Under the Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be
-"taken for public use without just compensation." 185 A violation of
the "Takings Clause" first requires that private property be somehow
impaired. State or local actions involving liquor licenses may affect
private property in one of two ways.1 86 First, a state or local action
may restrict or prohibit the use of real property for the retail sale of
liquor. Second, the liquor license itself may be considered personal
property' 87 and may be affected by state action.
1. Regulation of Land Used for Retail Liquor Sales
States inherently possess the power to regulate land use to pro-
tect citizens' health, safety, and welfare. The authority to use this po-
lice power is typically delegated to local governing units, either
through the state constitution or through an enabling statute. Justice
Holmes' majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 8' in
1922, however, encouraged courts to scrutinize the exercise of police
power to regulate land when it appears that the regulation has gone
"too far" and should be "recognized as a taking" of property.189 Since
the declaration of this vague, but "oft-cited maxim,"'19° courts have
struggled to determine when land use regulation goes "too far" and
becomes an appropriation by the government of private property for
public purposes, requiring just compensation for the impairment or
destruction of property interests.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
186. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-78 (1982) ("property" for
the purposes of the Takings Clause includes both personal property and real property
interest).
187. See supra notes 24-79 and accompanying text, for a discussion of whether liquor
license is a property right.
188. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
189. Id. at 415.
190. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
The takings test developed in Agins v. City of Tiburon'91 finds a
Fifth Amendment violation when land-use regulation "does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land."' 92 In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 93 the Court expanded the Agins test by establishing
a per se taking whenever the "regulation denies all economically ben-
eficial or productive use of the land."1 94 In the case of local control
over liquor stores, the regulation will most likely advance legitimate
state interests by reducing or eliminating local problems such as loiter-
ing, graffiti, and other crime associated with having a liquor store in
the neighborhood. 95 Therefore, if a liquor store owner challenges the
action, the challenge will likely be based on the assertion that the ac-
tion constitutes an interference with the property owner's economic
expectations.
When a zoning action precludes a land owner from using her
property for a retail liquor operation, the land owner is not denied all
economically viable use of her land, since other retail use can be made
of the property.196 Although the land owner may be able to show that
a retail liquor sales outlet is the most profitable use of her property, it
is unlikely that a court will agree that it is the only economically viable
use of her land.' 97 Thus, the takings principle outlined in the Lucas
decision, requiring that the land owner be denied all economically via-
ble use,198 will not be the appropriate test to use in a challenge against
191. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
192. Id at 260 (emphasis added).
193. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
194. Id at 2893 (emphasis added). In Lucas the Court admits that it has not adopted
any "'set formula' for determining how far is 'too far,' preferring to 'engag[e] in ... essen-
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" The Court does describe "two discrete categories of regu-
latory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint." Id The first category requires compensation when
there is a physical invasion of the property, and the second category requires compensation
where the "regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land." Id
195. See infra notes 288-289 and accompanying text.
196. Ross v. City of Chicago, No. 89 C8049, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3276, at *7 (N.D. Il.
Mar. 22, 1990) (plaintiff is not prevented from using his leasehold for other types of retail
businesses or conveying his interest in the leasehold, therefore the referendum precludes
only one of several economically viable uses for plaintiff's property).
197. See Kessler v. Department of Transp., 235 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (evi-
dence of "unique" value of condemned land based on business being located in choice
location for a liquor store in the county justified special damages in an eminent domain
action for loss of business caused by the taking of a liquor dealer's leasehold interest in the
condemned property).
198. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260(1980)).
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land use restrictions prohibiting a liquor store operation. In Ross v.
City of Chicago,199 for example, the court noted that the owner of a
Chicago liquor store, located in a precinct where a local liquor refer-
endum prohibited liquor sales, was not prevented from using his lease-
hold "for other types of retail businesses or conveying his interest in
the leasehold. ' '200 The referendum only prohibited "one of several ec-
onomically viable uses" for the owner's property.201
If the land owner can show that no other economically viable use
can be made of her property, the government may still be able to reg-
ulate land use without compensating the land owner. Under Lucas,
land use regulation that denies a land owner all economically viable
use of property will be allowed if the regulation prevents an activity
that would have been considered a nuisance under historical state
common law.2°n The sale of intoxicating liquor has been deemed a
common law nuisance by some courts,2"3 although many of the deci-
sions involved liquor operations that were illegal.2°4
In Mugler v. Kansas,205 a brewery owner asserted that the state
had "taken" his factory by prohibiting the manufacture or sale of alco-
hol. The Court held that such a prohibition was not a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment since the state was legislating to prevent a
public harm.20 6 Although the Court did not directly hold that the
manufacture or sale of alcohol was a nuisance, it reasoned that "[tihe
exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is
199. No. 89 C 8049, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3276 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1990).
200. Id at *3.
201. Id at *8.
202. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
203. See, e.g., Smith v. Nickoloff, 277 N.W. 880, 881 (Mich. 1938) (court will restrain as
a nuisance disturbances accompanying the operation of defendants' restaurant, which
serves liquor, such as the presence of "intoxicated persons about the premises, fighting and
making considerable noise until as late as 2 o'clock in the morning").
204. See State v. Phoenix Say. Bank & Trust, 198 P.2d 1018 (Ariz. 1948); Pensacola and
Atl. R.R. v. State, 5 So. 833, 841 (Fla. 1889) ("State has the constitutional power to declare
that any place kept and maintained for the illegal manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors shall be deemed a common nuisance and be abated"); State v. Mitchell, 399 P.2d
556 (Kan. 1965) (property used for illegal possession and sale of intoxicating liquor consti-
tutes a common nuisance); State v. Saskey's Lounge, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 156 (Mich. 1976)
(purpose of public nuisance abatement statute is to eliminate use of real or personal prop-
erty in connection with gambling, prostitution, and illicit sale of liquor); Parker v. State,
208 S.W.2d 380,384 (rex. Civ. App.), affd, 212 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1948) (in order to show a
common nuisance on the ground that "intoxicating liquors are kept, possessed, sold, manu-
factured, bartered or given away," it must be alleged and proved that such activity was in
violation of some penal law of the state).
205. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
206. I at 669.
474
itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular
way" is a nuisance abatement, not a taking.207 The mere location of a
lawful retail liquor store may constitute a nuisance - not because of
illegality, but because of the associated crime problems accompanying
such a land use.20 8 If such land use is found to constitute a nuisance
under state historic common law, the government authority may con-
stitutionally deprive a land owner of all economically viable use of her
property for retail liquor sales, provided the regulatory action is ra-
tionally or reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose, such as
preventing criminal activity.209
Assuming the more likely finding that a landowner has not been
deprived of all economically viable use when denied the opportunity
to operate a retail liquor sales outlet, the landowner will be unable to
establish a "per se" taking claim under Lucas. A court, however, must
perform an ad hoe factual analysis of the circumstances by using those
factors that have "particular significance" in a takings decision as out-
lined by Justice Brennan in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City.210 Significant factors to consider are: 1) "the economic im-
pact of the regulation on claimant," 2) its interference with reasonable
"investment-backed expectations," and 3) "the character of the gov-
ernmental action" (e.g. whether there has been a physical invasion).211
207. IL See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2890 (1992)
(noting "our Mugler line of cases recognizes governmental power to prohibit 'noxious' uses
of property-i.e., uses of property akin to 'public nuisances'-without having to pay com-
pensation"). But see id. at 2913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating "[t]he brewery closed in
Mugler itself was not a common-law nuisance, and the Court specifically stated that it was
the role of the legislature to determine what measures would be.appropriate for the protec-
tion of public health and safety"); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. Rv. 1433,
1436 n.22 (1993) ("conduct proscribed by the alcohol prohibition law which was sustained
in Mugler v. Kansas would not have been enjoined as a common law nuisance").
208. The court in Ross v. City of Chicago, N. 89 C 8049, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3276, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. March 22, 1990), cited Mugler v. Kansas for the conclusion that the local
referendum law at issue, which prohibited retail alcohol sales in the precinct, was not a
taking since the restriction of the plaintiff's property was no greater than the restriction in
Mugler, which rendered the brewery buildings and machinery of little value.
209. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (liquor is
not a common nuisance).
210. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Lucas Court makes clear in a footnote that a "landowner
whose deprivation is one step short of complete" is not necessarily deprived of a remedy
for a taking, but is only unable to "claim the benefit of our categorical formulation." Lu-
cas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 & n.8. The Court notes that there is still a takings analysis that
should be made based on the factors noted in Penn Central, such as "'the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant."' Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
211. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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It is difficult to predict how a court will decide any particular tak-
ings claim involving a retail liquor sales outlet due to the ad hoe analy-
sis of the particular facts surrounding each challenged regulatory
action required under Penn Central.212 When the owner of a license is
prohibited from using the license at a particular location, however,
this deprivation may give rise to an interference with the landowner's
"investment-backed expectations" of using her real property in con-
junction with her liquor license.213 Liquor store owners in inner city
locations have insisted that liquor stores are the only profitable use
that can be made of their property.214 In some cases, liquor store
owners have argued that operational restrictions imposed by local au-
thorities may drastically reduce their profitability.215 Thus, any land
use regulation which prohibits licensees from using their property as
liquor stores, or which severely restricts the operation of their busi-
nesses, will have a distinct "economic impact" on ownership interests
and may constitute a taking.216
2. Regulation of Liquor Licenses as Personal Property
If the liquor license itself is considered a property interest,217 a
takings challenge can be raised whenever a regulatory action detri-
212. See Berkowitz v. United States, 304 F.2d 168, 172 (1st Cir. 1965) (stating that
"[t]he medicines which courts administer when liquor is involved have their own peculiar
emotional or, conceivably, rational elements, and are not suitable prescriptions for the
generality of cases").
213. See Wilcox v. Miller, No. 89 C 20053, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19172 (N.D. III. Nov.
6, 1990) (denial of a liquor license does not give rise to a complaint that real property has
been "taken" without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if that prop-
erty's value is somewhat diminished); State v. Saugen, 169 N.W.2d 37, 42-43 (Minn. 1969)
(loss of going-concern value is recoverable in a condemnation action where liquor license
may be transferable between persons, but must relate to the specific premises identified in
the liquor license).
214. The owner of a liquor store that burned down in the Spring 1992 riots in Los
Angeles laments that his income will "be more than wiped out if the city successfully im-
poses new restrictions on [his store], such as reducing operating hours to 9 a.m. to 9 p.m.
and requiring two licensed security guards to patrol the store and parking lot during busi-
ness hours. The guards alone could cost $8,000 a month." Greg Krikorian, The Bottleneck,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1993, at A14.
215. Id.
216. Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43,48 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (denial of renewal
of liquor license impairs both occupation of selling liquor and the value of investment in
the tavern). But see Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1986) (denial
of license does not diminish economic interest in tavern since building may be sold or
converted to another use).
217. This is a lofty assumption since many states do not recognize a property interest in
liquor licenses. See supra notes 30-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of how cer-
tain property attributes can be used to determine whether or not a particular state will
recoguize a property interest in a liquor license. See Dagley v. Incorporated Town of
mentally impacts a licensee's ownership interests. Some courts do not
address the issue of whether the license itself is property, but instead
address whether a property right exists to "engage in or continue to
engage in the liquor business." '218 The distinction between whether
the liquor license constitutes property or whether the right to engage
in liquor sales constitutes property does not appear to affect the tak-
ings analysis when regulatory action interferes with a liquor license
holder.2 9
The analysis of a personal property taking is similar to the analy-
sis of a taking of real property.2 0 Thus, the Agins test must be ap-
Fairview Park, 371 N.E.2d 1338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (license to sell alcoholic beverages is
not property and, therefore, no constitutional question concerning the taking of property
arises); Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 333 N.E.2d 414 (Mass.
1975) (liquor licenses confer no property rights on licensees thus liquor licenses may be
revoked without compensation); State ex reL Carman v. Ross, 162 S.W. 702 (Mo. Ct. App.
1914) (revocation of liquor license not unconstitutional since license is not a "right of prop-
erty"); Yarbrough v. Montoya, 214 P.2d 769 (N.M. 1950) (liquor license is a privilege and
not property). But see Kimura v. Battley, 969 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
liquor license in Alaska constitutes property, within the meaning of federal law, subject to
a federal tax lien); State v. Saugen, 169 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1969) (owner of liquor lounge
entitled to compensation for loss of liquor license in condemnation proceeding for prop-
erty on which lounge was located); Redevelopment Auth. of Phila. v. Driscoll, 405 A.2d
975 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (loss of liquor license is a compensable property interest in a
condemnation proceeding); Mary J. Cavins, Annotation, Loss of Liquor License as Com-
pensable in Condemnation Proceeding, 58 A.L.R.3d 581 (1974). It should be noted that
although a state may determine that a liquor license is property for the purposes of due
process, the same state may find that the license is not property for the purposes of finding
a taking. Nunnally v. Moore, 570 P.2d 195, 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (while a liquor li-
cense may be considered a property right between a licensee and a third party, the license
is only considered a privilege between the licensee and the state, however, the licensee is
still entitled to procedural due process before her license may be suspended or revoked).
218. Country Liquors, Inc. v. City Council, 264 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. 1978) (citing
Arens v. Village of Rogers, 61 N.W.2d 508,519 (1953)) (no vested property right to engage
in liquor business); Gas 'N Shop, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d
784, 789 (Neb. 1988) ("right to engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors involves a mere
privilege").
219. The court in Myers v. Holshouser, 214 S.E.2d 630, 638 (N.C. 1975), notes that the
prevailing view among states is that a liquor license is not property, but explains that
"North Carolina has taken the position that' [a] license to engage in a business or practice
a profession is a property right that cannot be suspended or revoked without due process
of law."' See also AGL, Inc. v. North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 315
S.E.2d 718, 720 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (right to sell beer and wine is not a constitutional or
property right).
220. "There is no question that the takings clause protects against uncompensated tak-
ings of tangible real property and tangible personal property." Jack M. Beermann, Gov-
ernment Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68
B.U. L. REv. 277, 301-02 (1988) (citing L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 169-74
(1985)) see also Sutfin v. California 67 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (1968) (federal and state consti-
tutions and California decisions do not distinguish between real property and personal
property with respect to the requirement of just compensation). The Lucas opinion, how-
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plied to any regulatory action affecting a liquor license.22 1 Because
the liquor licensing regulation will most likely advance legitimate state
interests by reducing or eliminating local crime associated with neigh-
borhood liquor outlets, the first prong of the Agins test is met. The
second prong of the Agins test, however, requires an examination of
the nature of the challenged regulatory action. If the license is denied,
revoked, or not renewed, then the licensee, or potential licensee, will
be denied all economically viable use of the license itself and the ac-
tion will be subject to a per se takings claim under LucasM2 - a claim
based on the personal property interest in the liquor license itself.
Under Lucas, the licensee might have a claim of entitlement to just
compensation for the value of the license to the licensee.223
If the regulation affects only one portion of the property interest
in the license, then Lucas is not applicable and the court must perform
an ad hoc analysis based upon the Penn Central factors.211 In New
Mexico, for example, a newly enacted section of the Liquor Control
Act was challenged as a taking of property because it provided that,
after an amortization period of 10 years, licensees would be unable to
convey, encumber, or devise their liquor licenses.22s The dissent in
the New Mexico Supreme Court decision argued that liquor licenses
were "in the nature of property interests" and that the "Act does de-
prive licensees of substantially all their beneficial use of certain prop-
erty interests in the licenses" therefore justifying compensation as a
taking.226 The majority, however, reiterated its earlier holding that "a
ever, appears to draw a "peculiar distinction between land and personal property." Sax
supra note 207, at 1441 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2899-900 (1992), "in the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to be aware of the
possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at
least if the property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale)").
221. See supra text accompanying note 192.
222. But see Replogle v. Commonwealth of Pa., 523 A2d 327,331 (Pa. 1987) (no taking
of property without compensation as a result of a local-option election since license was
issued subject to condition that voters could ban liquor sales at some future time).
223. See Philly's v. Bryne, 732 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1984). Although the Philly's decision
addressed only the issue of deprivation of due process, the expiration of the license as a
result of a local-option election may have also been subject to a takings claim.
224. Wilcox v. Miller, No. 89 C 20053, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19172, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 6, 1990) (denial of liquor license is not a taking because it does not prevent plaintiff
from pursuing an occupation and it "'does not even diminish significantly the economic
interest in the tavern"' (quoting Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir.
1986))); see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
225. Chronis v. State, 670 P.2d 953 (N.M. 1983) (constitutional challenge to the Liquor
Control Act, 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 39, § 36).
226. ld. at 960-61.
liquor license is a privilege ... and not a... right."' 7 The Court,
applying a takings analysis, also noted that the regulation is reason-
ably related to a proper purpose and does not unreasonably deprive
the owner of all or substantially all of the beneficial use of his license.
"[C]urrent liquor license holders have the continued right to engage in
the alcoholic beverage business" in addition to other rights, such as
using the license away from the premises for special occasions? 28
Regulatory actions that affect only certain rights or privileges of
the licensee may not be considered a taking if some beneficial use of
the license remains. When a state or local authority deprives the licen-
see of all rights in the liquor license, however, the licensee may be
entitled to demand compensation. Just compensation for a taking of
personal property will be required under the Fifth Amendment, but
only if the liquor license itself is considered a property interest enti-
tled to constitutional protection against government action.
H. Constitutional Protections That do Not Require a Finding
That the License is a Property Interest
Substantive due process and equal protection do not require the
existence of a property right. Thus, it is not necessary to decide
whether a liquor license is property for purposes of determining con-
stitutional protection under these principles.2 9
A. Substantive Due Process
Constitutional substantive due process, as applied to state or local
regulatory actions, protects against state action that is "arbitrary and
unreasonable or without proper relation to the legitimate legislative
227. Id at 956.
228. Id at 957.
229. Illinois grants minimal procedural due process protection to liquor licenses be-
cause a license is not considered a property interest. Some Illinois decisions, however,
have required that any action taken be fair and not arbitrary, a holding that is most likely
based on substantive due process considerations. Goode v. Thomas, 334 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1975) (liquor license is a privilege, not a right, but a person entitled to sell liquor
is entitled to fair treatment when public officers grant, deny, suspend or revoke liquor
licenses); Spiros Lounge, Inc. v. State Liquor Control Comm'n, 423 N.E.2d 1366 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1981) ("State Liquor Control Commissioner is vested with broad discretionary power
to be exercised reasonably."); McCray v. Daley, 272 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) ("Reg-
ulation of a liquor business must be pursuant to a reasonable exercise of police power; it
must not be arbitrary or discriminatory, and one applying for a license is entitled to fair
treatment from those empowered to grant or deny license.").
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purpose."'230 The right to engage in retail liquor sales as a lawful busi-
ness must "yield to the greater right of the public to be protected in its
moral, social, and economic welfare." 231 However, a "real and sub-
stantial relationship [must exist] between the regulations imposed and
the prevention of injury to the moral, social, or economic welfare of
the public."'' 32 The governmental unit must act within its authority
when it takes action against a liquor licensee and must demonstrate
that the action is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 233
Many decisions find a rational relationship between liquor regu-
lations and legitimate state purposes23 because the rational basis test
is easy to meet" 5 and because great deference is given to state liquor
regulations under the Twenty-first Amendment." 6 In Sea Girt Restau-
rant v. Borough of Sea Girt,-3 7 for example, the district court permit-
ted the Borough to restrict, by popular vote, the hours liquor could be
sold within a community. The court held that the referendum process
used to limit the liquor licensee was not a violation of substantive due
process because it was "rationally related to any number of valid
health, safety and welfare concerns, including the concerns of reduc-
ing such problems caused by the influx of summer tourists as traffic
and parking problems, vandalism and noise and reducing the incidents
230. B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607, 613 (Me. 1972) (quoting
Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 308 (1917)).
231. Reynolds v. Louisiana Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 173 So. 2d 57, 64-65
(La. Ct. App. 1965).
232. Id. at 65.
233. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); see, eg., B.P.O.E.
Lodge No. 2043,297 A.2d 607 (rational relationship exists where a liquor license is denied
because private Lodge membership was restricted to "whites" and state's public policy is
not to discriminate).
234. Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. 504 (1847) (laws regulating li-
quor licenses are proper exercise of police power to protect public health, welfare, and
morals as "intoxicating drinks [are] an evil"); Berry v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 420 F.
Supp. 934,943 (D. Wyo. 1976) (tribal council's denial of application for a liquor license was
not shown to be arbitrary and capricious).
235. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 (1991) (under rational basis test, a law will
not be overturned unless it is "so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of
legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the.., actions [of the legislature and
voters] were irrational" (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). This, coupled
with the heightened state interest discussed supra notes 8-9, makes the rational basis test
very easy to satisfy.
236. States have authority to specify the times, places, and circumstances under which
liquor may be sold within their borders. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691
(1984); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35
(1966). See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
237. 625 F. Supp. 1482 (D.NJ. 1986).
of drunk driving.' '12 8 The court explained that the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the states almost limitless power to regulate the
sale and distribution of liquor, including hours of sale.2 3 9
In contrast, the court in Reynolds v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic
Beverage Control40 found no rational relationship between certain
statutory requirements for the issuance of a license and the protection
of the morals, health, safety, economic, or general welfare of the pub-
lic.2 4 1 The regulations at issue limited: the number of square feet of
storage space for the wholesaler's liquor stock, the wholesaler's own-
ership or operation of delivery trucks, the brand representation main-
tained with distilleries, the number of customers and the extent of the
wholesaler's trade area, the percentage of sales to customers, and the
volume and cost of the wholesaler's inventory.242 The Louisiana court
agreed that "economic stability and financial responsibility of liquor
dealers, both wholesale and retail, are desirable" goals and that legis-
lation reasonably designed to accomplish such goals might be a lawful
exercise of police power to protect the public moral, social, or eco-
nomic welfare.243 The court, however, found no rational connection
between the regulations and these goals and observed that insuring
the economic and financial stability of wholesale liquor dealers could
be accomplished by more direct and appropriate means.244 Because
courts grant great deference to states in regulating liquor salesms and
apply a rational basis test to state action, most liquor sale regulation is
practically immune to a substantive due process attack.
B. Equal Protection
Whenever the government treats similarly situated individuals
differently, an equal protection violation may arise.24 Land use regu-
238. Id. at 1493.
239. Id. at 1492 (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 119 (1972); G. & J.K. Enters.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 205 N.J. Super. 77, 82 (1985)).
240. 173 So. 2d 57 (La. 1965).
241. Id. at 65-66. See also Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Wynne, 294 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla.
1974) (restrictions on retail vendors of beer and wine, which were subjected to a "cash
only" purchase policy while vendors of hard liquors and spirits were granted credit, were
not rationally related to the purposes of promoting temperance and anti-monopoly and
were, therefore, unconstitutional).
242. I& at 65.
243. Id
244. Id at 66.
245. See supra notes 6-9.
246. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982); State v. Smart, 136 P. 452 (Wyo. 1913) (no
violation of equal protection when police regulation is applied uniformly to all persons
similarly situated).
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lations raise equal protection concerns because they classify landown-
ers based upon their use of their land. 47 Whether such classification
denies equal protection, however, will depend on whether a particular
decision, either legislative or administrative, "unreasonably discrimi-
nates in its definition of a class, in its treatment of fundamental rights,
or in its choice of means to accomplish an intended objective.1248
Land use regulations may be attacked facially, or as applied to an indi-
vidual landowner.24 9 An equal protection challenge may also arise
when a regulatory action, interfering with liquor licenses as personal
property, affects similarly situated individuals differently.250
The standard of judicial review applied to equal protection claims
varies according to the interest affected by the regulatory action. As a
general rule, the statute is presumed valid and will be upheld if the
statutory classification at issue bears some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.25' "It is well settled that economic and social
legislation generally is presumed valid. '"2s2 On the other hand,"quasi-
suspect" classifications, such as gender, illegitimacy, and alienage, are
subject to intermediate judicial scrutiny that requires a substantial re-
lationship to an important or substantial state interest.253 Finally, the
court will apply a strict scrutiny standard if it finds that distinctions are
based upon a suspect classification, such as race, or that a fundamental
247. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 60, § 2.41 (2d ed. 1988).
248. Patch Enters. v. McCall, 447 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (Powell, J., con-
curring) ("There is nothing inherently suspect about regulating businesses that deal in alco-
holic beverages.").
249. Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 742 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. ill. 1990) (denial of special
use permit to operate day care center while allowing nursery schools in church building is
equal protection violation).
250. Parham v. Hix, 608 F. Supp. 546 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (It was a denial of equal protec-
tion for the sheriff and county commissioners to refuse to grant a beer and wine license to a
qualified applicant while at the same time conspiring to ignore illegal beer sales by other
establishments in the county).
251. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Gulf,
Colo. & Santa Fe R.R. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886); see Weller v. Hopper, 379 P.2d 792,795 (Idaho 1963) (holding that a statute prohib-
iting felons from holding liquor licenses was a denial of equal protection because the classi-
fication was unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory).
252. Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n. v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 889
F.2d 929, 932 (10th Cir. 1989) (analyzing state employees' equal protection claim regarding
state provisions prohibiting them from obtaining liquor licenses or working in positions in
a business that requires such licenses).
253. Id (citing City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440.41
(1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982)).
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interest, such as privacy, is affectedV54 Under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the regulatory authority must have a compelling governmental
interest to justify distinguishing between regulatory targets based
upon a suspect classification or fundamental interest.255
Suspect classifications and fundamental interests are generally
not at issue when regulating liquor licenses and, therefore, strict scru-
tiny of regulatory action is not applied.256 As a result, most regula-
tions are upheld under the rational basis test. For example, in Adams
v. Department of Law Enforcemen 57 the Idaho Supreme Court ob-
served that "[s]ome discrimination is inherent in any legislative at-
tempt to limit the number of retail outlets for liquor by the drink.""58
Legislation, according to the Court, should be presumed constitu-
254. TRIE, supra note 81, at 1000; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
255. This is a "strict scrutiny" standard of review, which is much more difficult to satisfy
than the rational basis test. Strict scrutiny is applied when a regulation is intended to treat
people dissimilarly, not when the impact unintentionally results in the dissimilar treatment
of people. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). If the legislation calls for dis-
crimination on its face (as written), or is specifically applied so as to create a discriminatory
effect, this might require heightened scrutiny. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(holding that operation of ordinances regulating laundry facilities was discriminatory in its
application and, thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause). The Court in Yick Wo stated
that it was unnecessary to consider the potential impartiality which the regulation pro-
vided, because the laws were, in fact, applied in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 373.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74.
256. See, ag., Brown v. City of Lake Geneva, 919 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1990) (ra-
tional basis test is applied because plaintiff cannot allege any classification receiving height-
ened scrutiny and "a liquor license does not rise to the level of a fundamental right");
Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n. v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commn., 889 F.2d 929,
932 (10th Cir. 1989) (ability to pursue employment in the alcoholic beverage business is a
"fundamental right only in the limited context of the privileges and immunities clause");
Benel, Inc. v. Barry Civil Action, No. 88-3413, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9692 (D.D.C. Aug.
15, 1989) (petition process creating two classes of applicants was rationally related to legiti-
mate interest in increasing citizen involvement in decisions affecting their neighborhoods);
Jones v. City of Troy, 405 F. Supp. 464,470 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (no invidious discrimination
against suspect class or fundamental personal right found to justify more than a rational
basis analysis of the liquor licensing regulations); Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 204 A.2d 853,
860 (NJ. 1964) (legislature may constitutionally terminate or severely regulate all liquor
sales within the State "[s]o long as the regulations contain no irrational classifications or
invidious discriminations").
257. 580 P.2d 858, 860 (Idaho 1978).
258. Id.
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tional provided the discriminatory classification is reasonably related
to a legitimate public purpose.2s9 The court held that the denial of a
liquor license application to a sports club did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because liquor licenses were confined to city limits
and no new licenses were available, even though exemptions were
available in the statute for golf courses, ski resorts, common carriers,
lake resorts, and operators of convention centers.260 The dissent in
Adams pointed out that liquor control statutes have, however, been
invalidated when statutes create a classification that violates equal
protection.261
Legislation has been invalidated on the basis that the regulations
created arbitrary classifications that were not rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose.262 In State ex rel. Classics Tavern Co. v. Mc-
Mahon,263 for example, the court found that an ordinance requiring a
tavern to pay taxes allegedly owed as a condition for renewal of a
liquor license was invidious discrimination and a denial of equal pro-
tection because it did not impose a similar tax burden on other non-
liquor businesses in the same shopping center.2 4
Challenges to regulations that classify sellers of alcoholic bever-
ages do not typically invoke either intermediate scrutiny or strict scru-
tiny because the classifications are not generally based on a quasi-
suspect class, a suspect class, or a fundamental right.265 However,
strict scrutiny will be applied when a liquor license applicant has been
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin. In Flores
259. Id
260. Id
261. Id at 861, 862 (Donaldson, J., dissenting) (observing that it is not rational to refuse
license to a sports club because the sport involved is tennis and not golf since "[iut does not
seem to me that tennis players require greater protection from the evils of drink than
golfers"). The Adams court also cites several cases illustrating the court's willingness to
invalidate these statutes if they violate equal protection: Women's Liberation Union v.
Israel, 512 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1975), Daugherty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
United States v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969), Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v.
Martin, 16 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Wash. 1936), Arizona State Liquor Bd. v. Ali, 550 P.2d 663
(Ariz. 1976), City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1957), Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Bd. v. Burke, 481 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1972), George Benz Sons, Inc. v. Ericson, 34 N.W.2d
725 (Minn. 1948).
262. Tavern League v. City of Madison, 389 N.W.2d 54,58 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (viola-
tion of equal protection to "arbitrarily and unreasonably [classify] sellers of alcoholic bev-
erages separately from all other city licensees for the purpose of tax collection").
263. 783 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
264. Id at 466.
265. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text.
v. Pierce,166 the police chief filed a protest with the California ABC
against the liquor license application of a Mexican-American couple
stating that "granting the license would lead to an undue concentra-
tion of licenses in Calistoga and aggravate an existing police prob-
lem. '267 The court held that the evidence presented in district court
was sufficient to support a jury finding that city officials violated the
Flores' equal protection rights by filing protests against the applicants
that were motivated by race or national origin.2 1 Similarly, the court
in Sherwin Manor Nursing Center, Inc. v. McAuliffe 6 9 found that
plaintiff had stated a claim for denial of equal protection based upon
allegations that Illinois state licensing officials forced the applicant to
undertake "extraordinary measures" by reason of their race or na-
tional origin for issuance of a license for a long-term nursing care fa-
cility °70 The plaintiff in Sherwin alleged that he "was subjected to
differential treatment by the state surveyors based upon the sur-
veyor's anti-Semitic animus." 71 Although the court recognized that
"[t]he defendants' anti-Semitic remarks may not by themselves give
rise to an equal protection action," this "verbal abuse accompanied by
the imposition of a special administrative burden forms the basis of an
equal protection claim." 27 Regulatory action following the 1992 Los
Angeles riots may arguably require use of a strict scrutiny standard if
equal protection claims are made. It has been observed that "most of
the stores burned down in South-Central were owned by Korean-
Americans. 2 73 When these store owners apply for rebuilding per-
mits, attempts by local authorities to "clamp down" on the liquor
store overconcentration problem may be subject to a strict scrutiny
standard.2 74 Korean-Americans argue that prohibiting the rebuilding
266. 617 F.2d 1386,1390 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980); see also Shaw
v. California Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 1986) (alle-
gations that excessive police activity at plaintiffs' bar was undertaken because the plaintiffs
are black constitute an allegation of a policy of unconstitutional discriminatory enforce-
ment of the laws sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss).
267. Flores, 617 F.2d at 1388. It is interesting to note that the police chief's stated con-
cern about an overconcentration problem in the Flores case is the same concern voiced by
Los Angeles citizens in the rebuilding efforts after the 1992 riots. See infra notes 269-272
and accompanying text.
268. Id. at 1390.
269. 37 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir. 1994).
270. Id at 1222.
271. Id. at 1221.
272. Id,
273. Johnson, supra note 10, at Al.
274. See Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1980) ("If the rigors of the gov-
ernmental or administrative process are imposed upon certain persons with an intent to
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of their stores will deepen the emotional scars already inflicted.275
Ryan Song of the Korean-American Grocers Association complained
that "' it's almost like a witch hunt"' because "the liquor stores are
being made scapegoats for problems that are far more complicated
than who sells alcohol. '27 6
Decisions regulating the rebuilding process in Los Angeles may
not be based upon race or national origin. The decisions, however,
may disproportionately affect Korean-Americans because they appear
to have been targeted by the arsonists. The Supreme Court's decision
in Washington v. Davi 2 7 7 indicates that an equal protection claim by
Korean-American liquor store owners, based solely upon dispropor-
tionate impact, is unlikely to succeed. In Washington v. Davis, the
Court determined that District of Columbia recruiting procedures for
police officer applicants did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.2 78 The Court reasoned that discriminatory impact alone was
not sufficient to show a violation and that the plaintiffs (African-
Americans in this case) "could no more successfully claim that the test
denied them equal protection than could white applicants who also
failed." 279 Nevertheless, "disparate racial effect is evidence that may
be adduced to prove the invidious intent that is the essence of the
violation. 280
The degree to which courts will scrutinize regulatory actions hav-
ing a disproportionate impact may also be influenced by the Califor-
nia v. LaRue28 1 decision. In LaRue, the Court confirmed that a state
agency, whose authority is based on the Twenty-first Amendment, will
be given "wide latitude" in choosing how it will accomplish a permissi-
ble end. One state court has interpreted LaRue as declaring that
burden, hinder, or punish them by reason of their race or national origin, then this imposi-
tion constitutes a denial of equal protection .. .
275. Id
276. Krikorian, supra note 214, at A14.
277. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
278. Id at 246.
279. Id. See also Conti v. City of Fremont, 919 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990) (not-
ing that even though majority of patrons affected were minorities, impact of restaurant
closing due to failure to amend liquor license was not a violation of equal protection).
280. See Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Disparate racial impact
is of unquestioned relevance in proving the forbidden intent to discriminate.").
281. 409 U.S. 109 (1973).
282. Id at 116 (citing Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 48 (1966)). The state
does not, however, have a right under the Iwenty-first Amendment to "elevate police
power absolutely over the other provisions of the Constitution." New Safari Lounge, Inc.
v. City of Colorado Springs, 567 P.2d 372, 375 (Colo. 1977) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976)).
the TWenty-first Amendment "modifies the demands of the Four-
teenth as to regulation of alcohol use and distribution and makes state
action in this area subject only to the most lenient equal protection
review, the rational relationship standard. ' '2 3 In fact, "Nt]here is per-
haps no other area of permissible state action within which the exer-
cise of the police power of a state is more plenary than in the
regulation and control of the use and sale of alcoholic beverages. '"2 84
Courts will probably not apply a strict scrutiny standard to chal-
lenged liquor license regulatory actions, unless such actions dispropor-
tionately affect a suspect classification or fundamental right and there
is evidence of discriminatory motive.285 Moreover, since liquor li-
cense regulations and land use regulation of liquor outlets affect only
the economic interests of the licensee or landowner, the application of
a rational relationship standard is appropriate in most instances.286
Under this standard, the regulatory action will be valid provided a
rational basis supports it? 7 One of the greatest justifications for reg-
ulatory action is the protection of the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of the communities affected by overconcentration of liquor
283. Houser v. State, 540 P.2d 412, 414 (Wash. 1975), overruled by State v. Smith, 610
P.2d 869 (Wash. 1980).
284. In re Tahiti Bar, Inc., 150 A.2d 112, 115 (Pa. 1959).
285. See Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1980) ("There is also evidence
that the defendants acted with reference to racial classifications and offered explanations
which invoked stereotypes from which one could infer an intent to adopt a racial
classification.").
286. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1978); Conti v. City of
Fremont, 919 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that when the city's refusal to amend
a conditional use permit does not implicate a suspect class nor interfere with a constitu-
tional right the court will apply the ' rational basis' test under the Equal Protection
Clause).
287. Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen, 389 F.2d 713,717 (5th Cir. 1968) (states may
make classifications within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause provided the classi-
fications are not arbitrary); State ex reL Garrett v. Randall, 527 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. 1975) (en
banc) (liquor control law, which requires no evidentiary hearing for new or renewal liquor
licenses but which requires an evidentiary hearing before revocation or suspension of li-
quor licenses, does not deny equal protection, in view of rational basis for distinction); Gas
'N Shop, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Neb. 1988) (re-
strictive regulations do not deprive persons of equal protection of the law provided they do
not contain "irrational classifications or invidious discriminations"); Helms v. Texas Alco-
holic Beverage Comm'n, 700 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (denial of liquor permit does
not deny applicant right to equal protection, even though other restaurants along the same
street have been granted permits, because location of applicant's premises would cause
increased traffic hazard and result in increased danger to children and residents); see also
Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Wynne, 294 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1974) (statute requiring that all
sales of beer and wine to retail licensees be made in cash only violates the Equal Protection
Clause since such statutory discrimination is not rationally related to the purposes of the
Act).
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stores.'8 Indeed, the harmful effects that liquor stores have on the
communities they serve have become more evident throughout the
country. 89 Based on these considerations, it is doubtful that equal
protection challenges will be successful against most liquor license
regulation.
IL. Conclusion
A liquor license is a valuable asset to the license holder, whether
it be considered a privilege or a property interest. There is great di-
versity among and within the states as to whether the license should
be considered property and for what purposes. If the license is not
deemed to be property, procedural due process, which protects liberty
and property interests, will not be required and a regulatory takings
claim will not be warranted.
The determination of whether the liquor license is property may
be facilitated by examining the attributes attached to the license under
state law. The right to obtain, the right to alienate, the right to renew,
and the state's right to revoke the license are attributes that can deter-
mine whether the license has the traditional characteristics found in
the property bundle of rights. The greater the expectation generated
by state law, the greater the possibility that a liquor license will ac-
quire the characteristics of property. Statutory declarations of
whether the license is property may also exist under state law, but
courts may not always consider these declarations when making deci-
sions regarding constitutional protection of rights.
288. In Sacramento, for example, an ordinance proposed in 1993 would restrict sales at
liquor stores "that operate in a manner that is 'detrimental to the public peace, health or
safety."' Liquor Store Pollution, SACRAmENro BEE, May 25, 1993, at B6 (quoting a local
ordinance). "[C]ontrols would be imposed only where it can be shown that the store con-
stitutes a public nuisance by contributing to such problems as 'public inebriation, excessive
littering, public urination, harassment of passersby, illegal drug activity, assaults, batteries,
vandalism or police detentions and arrests."' Id. (quoting a new local ordinance.) One
commentator has gone as far as to suggest that "no one disputes that trouble often accom-
panies an abundance of [retail liquor] outlets." Judy Ronningen, 71isting the Tail of De-
mon Rum; Neighborhoods Go After Drinking, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1993, at Al.
289. Alexei Barrionuevo & Nora Lopez, Liquor Stores Wamed; Police conduct sweep
near S. Dallas school, DALLAS MORMING Nnws, Nov. 16, 1993, at 15A (liquor stores near
school expose students "to street drunks and prostitutes on a daily basis"); Marina
Dundjerski, MetroWire Activists Rally to Rebuild L.A. Without Liquor Stores, UPI, June
20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnus File ("liquor stores create an environ-
ment of drug dealing, prostitution, gambling, alcohol sales to minors and fights"). See
Phuong Le, Measure Would Curtail Liquor Sales in the Mission, SF. CHRON., July 1, 1993,
at A13 ("liquor outlets foster public drunkenness, property defacement, drug trafficking,
domestic violence and other criminal activities").
Many state and most federal courts will judge the license to be a
property right for the purpose of granting federal due process protec-
tion, particularly when the action is for renewal or revocation of the
license. The majority of decisions that recognize a protectable prop-
erty right in a liquor license, however, find that the licensing actions at
issue do not violate procedural due process. The courts typically find
that no violation occurred either because some type of notice or op-
portunity to be heard is given or because the licensee should have
been aware at the time of licensing that certain actions, such as a ref-
erendum or a local option election, were a potential threat to his or
her license.
Similar results occur in most regulatory taking challenges to li-
quor licensing actions. In takings challenges, however, the courts gen-
erally recognize a protectable property right and then determine no
taking of property occurred2 90 Most liquor regulation will likely be
deemed to substantially advance legitimate state interests and the
court will probably find that the owner will not be denied economi-
cally viable use of his land.291 If the regulation affects the location of
the liquor store, the owner can still use the property for other eco-
nomically viable uses. However, if the license itself, as personal prop-
erty, is "taken," the licensee may have a valid claim for compensation
unless the licensee was aware that the license was not permanent at
the time it was first obtained.
State or local governing authorities may regulate liquor licensing
actions without violating a licensee's substantive due process rights
provided the government's action is rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose. Broad power is given to the state to regulate liquor
under the Twenty-first Amendment and this power may be delegated
to local units. This regulatory power is almost limitless, as most liquor
licensing controls will pass the lenient rational-relationship test. State
and local authorities may also treat similarly situated liquor licensees
differently, without violating equal protection rights, so long as the
regulatory classification bears some rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose. As with a substantive due process challenge, an
equal protection challenge against a regulatory classification or licens-
ing action will usually fail because courts apply a minimal review stan-
dard of rational relationship for actions that affect only the economic
interests of the licensee.
290. See supra notes 217-228 and accompanying text.
291. See Ross v. City of Chicago, No. 89 C8049, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3276, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1990).
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The regulation of liquor is a matter of great concern to the state,
to local residents, to the liquor industry, and to the owners of liquor
licenses and retail outlets. When regulatory authorities regulate this
trade to resolve problems such as the overconcentration of liquor
stores in urban areas, these authorities must be aware of the potential
constitutional challenges that may arise. Whenever the state confers a
privilege via a license, the licensee is likely to expect constitutional
protection. The extent of constitutional protection the state must pro-
vide will depend upon how state law has defined the licensee's rights,
whether the license is considered property, the reasonableness of the
state action, and the licensee's reliance on the expectation of
protection.
